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Abstract
Essays on the Economics of Education
Joshua C. Hall
The dissertation is a collection of essays examining three topics in the economics of
education. The essays focus on the institutional structure of local and national education
and the implications that demographics and institutional structure has on the productivity
and financing of education. The first chapter introduces my essays by providing a brief
overview of the economic study of education and highlights some of the major areas of
research overlapping the topics covered in this dissertation. Chapter 2 looks at the impact
of racial diversity on school performance. A measure of racial diversity is constructed for
Ohio school districts to investigate the net effect of racial diversity on school district
performance on statewide exams. The empirical results of this chapter suggest that racial
diversity negatively affects school district performance. Chapter 3 considers the impact of
interjurisdictional competition in the choice of a tax base. A spatial probit model is used
on Ohio school district data to investigate two issues: 1) do school districts engage in
‘yardstick competition’ in their choice of an income tax; and 2) does the negative impact
of interjurisdictional competition disappear once yardstick competition is taken into
account. The empirical evidence shows that districts do engage in yardstick competition
but that controlling for yardstick competition does not affect the significance of
interjurisdictional competition. Chapter 4 examines the role of institutions in the return to
human and physical capital. A theoretical model is developed where the effect of the
change in capital on the rate of growth depends on the level of institutional quality. The
empirical model is estimated using cross-country data, where measures of a country’s
institutions are interacted with their growth rates of physical and human capital. The
empirical results suggest that the institutional environment is very important in
translating human and physical capital accumulation into economic growth. Chapter 5
summarizes the key findings of previous chapters and discusses areas of future research.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Economics of Education
The emergence of the economics of education as an autonomous field in of inquiry within
economics did not begin until the early 1960s (Texeira 2000) when Theodore Schultz
(1961) made human capital the topic of his 1960 presidential address to the American
Economic Association. Human capital is the idea that the schooling and skills that
individuals acquire are not purely consumption goods but instead are assets that yield
income and other outputs over time. While the concept of human capital had been around
since the time of Adam Smith ([1776] 1998), the term and its study first came into
popular use beginning with Schultz’s presidential address. Historian of economic thought
Mark Blaug (1972) credits Schultz with initiating the ‘human investment revolution in
economic thought’ with his presidential address, subsequent articles, and influence over
graduate students at the University of Chicago. In terms of overall importance to study of
what we know consider the field of the economics of education, however, no one
individual has had more influence than Gary Becker.
His first article (1962) and book (1964) on human capital formed the theoretical
and empirical approach to human capital that we employ today. In his post-Nobel tribute
to Becker, Sherwin Rosen (1993: 26) says that “no one other than Becker has developed
these ideas into such a coherent and fruitful theory.” What separated Becker and others
post-1960 economists working on human capital issues from the previous literature on
the economics of education was a theoretical framework that allowed education to be
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both an investment and consumption good. Prior to 1960, the conventional view in
economics was that individuals attended school primarily because it was compulsory.
Any additional education beyond the age of compulsion was generally treated as
consumption (Blaug 1976). According to Rosen (1993), Becker’s theoretical and
empirical contributions forced the discipline to take a closer look at education, which in
turn led to tremendous improvements in our understanding of earnings in labor markets
(Psacharapolous 1985), the organization of the firm (Williamson 1985) and economic
growth (Romer 1986).
The 1960s and 1970s saw tremendous gains being made in human capital theory.
At the same time, began to focus on the institutional structure of education and its impact
on school outcomes. Unlike human capital theory, which primarily focused on explaining
wages or labor earnings, this new line of inquiry focused attention on how various inputs
into the education process translated into student outcomes (Hanushek 1996).
Researchers began to use so-called ‘education production functions’ to look at a variety
of factors thought to influence school productivity, typically measured by standardized
test scores or graduation rates. A prominent strain of this literature focuses on the role
that school resources play in school performance (Hanushek 1997). Another line of
inquiry focuses on the interaction between the structure of schooling in the United States
and its effect on school financing and outcomes. It is in this general area that my
dissertation focuses.
In his seminal paper, Tiebout (1956) considered households working in a
geographic area choosing among a market of local public good producers. In the extreme,
households would sort themselves into homogenous communities based on their

2

preferences over the local public good being provided such as education. If every
household had the same preference, there would only need to be one jurisdiction. As the
number of different household preferences for education increase, the number of
jurisdictions should increase proportionally to achieve perfect sorting by education
preference. In the real world, however, economies of scale (Kenny and Schmidt 1994),
geographic barriers (Hoxby 2000a), and legal barriers (Fischel 2007) limit the number of
school districts to a level below what would allow perfect sorting. As a result, the
educational preferences of many residents might vary considerably from that of the
median voter. This preference fractionalization can lead to reduced political oversight and
governance by voters (Romer, Rosenthal, and Munley 1992) or reduced spending on
public schools (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). Chapter 2 extends this literature by
considering the possibility that preference fractionalization by race leads not only to
lower spending but also to a decline in school quality.
Competition among local school districts has been found to lead to higher test
scores (Staley and Blair 1995; Hoxby 2000a). These general findings have recently been
called into question on empirical grounds (Rothstein 2005; Brasington 2007). Brasington
(2007) argues that failure to account for spatial dependence has led to an overstatement of
the effectiveness of interjurisdictional competition. The interjurisdictional competition
literature has been extended to the research on local government choice of tax
instruments. School districts might prefer to diversify their tax base by adopting an
income tax but choose not to do so, given that high-income residents might flee to nearby
school districts. This issue is addressed further in Chapter 3 using spatial econometrics to
address spatial dependence among school districts.
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Institutions – the humanly devised constraints that structure political and
economic interaction (North 1991) – have long been understood to be important to
economic development. Development economists have only recently begun to understand
the primacy of institutions for development policy (Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi
2004). Despite the recent recognition of the importance of institutions, traditional growth
theory and the development policy it engenders still tends to focus on physical and
human capital accumulation. In bad institutional environments, however, investment in
physical and human capital often has a lower social return because the increase in capital
is often directed towards zero or negative-sum activities. Actions that are privately
optimal in bad institutional environments (such as rent-seeking), reduce or eliminate the
benefits accruing to society at large from additions to the human and physical capital
stocks. Instead of increasing economic growth, spending scarce resources on physical and
human capital in countries with poor institutional environments can actually lower output
per worker instead of increasing it. The role that institutional quality plays in the return
on physical and human capital accumulation is investigated in Chapter 4.

1.2 Dissertation Research Agenda
There are three research essays in this dissertation that examine the effect of institutions
on educational outcomes and financing. The first essay, Chapter 2, looks at the impact of
racial diversity on school district performance. Chapter 3 addresses the issue of fiscal
competition in the choice among of an income tax and Chapter 4 examines the
effectiveness of investment in human and physical capital in different institutional
environments. Chapter 5 concludes with an overview of my findings.

4

In Chapter 2, I examine the empirical issue of whether or not racial diversity is
good for school district performance. The impact of racial diversity on school
performance has been an important policy issue for a long time, with social scientists
attempting to measure the influence of racial diversity on the academic achievement of
African-Americans since at least the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brown v.
Board of Education. In recent years, the economics literature has turned its attention back
to the issue of race as many popular school reforms such as ability tracking and charter
schools have led the racial composition of schools to become more homogeneous. As a
result of this change, a body of research has developed that looks at the effect of race on
school performance.
In the literature there are two possible channels through which racial diversity
could influence school district performance. The first perspective – the racial peer effect
channel – views integration as having positive benefits flowing from children of different
racial backgrounds being exposed to one another. Following Brown v. Board of
Education, this literature primarily focused on the impact of increased racial diversity on
African-American students. A second channel through which racial diversity could affect
school performance is through voting. Different racial groups could have systematically
different preferences over how schools should be operated and these different preferences
could manifest themselves in policies that are not conducive to the efficient operation of
schools. The basic intuition behind the models in this area is that in diverse communities
disagreement over the ‘right’ education policy will lead individuals with preferences
drastically different from the median voter to undertake actions that reduce school
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quality. For example, disgruntled voters could vote against new spending on schools in
order to finance private consumption.
These channels are both theoretically important reasons why racial diversity
might affect academic performance; however, these channels suggest different directional
effects of increasing racial diversity. The voting channel suggests that increasing racial
diversity would lead to a decline in school quality holding other factors constant while
the peer effect channel suggests that increasing diversity raises school quality.
Furthermore, the racial peer effect literature focuses almost exclusively on the benefits to
African-American children. If non-African-American students do worse as diversity
increases, the overall effect of increased diversity could be negative. In this chapter I
focus on the net effect of racial diversity on school performance. Using data on Ohio
school districts I find a consistently negative relationship between racial diversity and
school quality as measured by district-level test scores using a variety of different
specifications and robustness checks.
Chapter 3 considers the effect of interjurisdictional competition on the use of an
income tax to finance schools. Economic theory would predict that when given the
opportunity to do so, local governments would diversify across as many revenue sources
as possible. Ohio is one of two states that allow school districts to choose among tax
instruments. Public choice theory would suggest that local policymakers have an
incentive to diversify their tax base in order to minimize the risk associated with overreliance on any one particular tax base. Even if politicians did not value diversification
for political reasons, standard public finance principles (the ‘three-legged stool’ of
income, property, and sales taxes) argue in favor of diversification across all available
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bases. However when given the chance, many local governments do not diversify their
tax base. Why?
One argument put forth in the literature is that is that tax bases differ in their
mobility characteristics. The property tax base is primarily fixed in the short run while
the income tax base is fairly mobile. Local governments are unwilling to adopt an income
tax only to see mobile high-income households move to a nearby district. This theory
predicts that as the cost of mobility increases (fewer school districts in a given geographic
area) more school districts will use the income tax. Spry (2005) tested this theory using
data on Ohio school districts and found that the number of districts within 10 miles
depresses income tax adoption.
In my paper, I challenge this finding on theoretical and empirical grounds. Caplan
(2001) argues you cannot escape taxation by moving because of capitalization. Since the
costs and benefits of higher taxes are reflected in home prices, high-income taxpayers
cannot escape school district income taxes. When they go to sell their home they will get
less for the home because of the higher tax-to-benefit ratio. Thus ‘voting with your feet’
is unlikely to limit the use of income taxes. In addition, the spatial pattern of income tax
adoption identified by Spry (2005) as being consistent with interjurisdictional
competition depressing income tax usage is also consistent with other spatial theories,
such as yardstick competition, or non-spatial reasons such as tax exportation.
In addition, Spry (2005) employs traditional probit when estimating the
probability of a school district adopting an income tax. This approach does not take into
account spatial spillovers and thus estimated parameters are likely to be biased,
inconsistent, and inefficient (Anselin 1988). Previous empirical work has found that the
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effects of interjurisdictional competition often disappear once spatial effects are taken
into account (Brasington 2007), suggesting that the previous literature might be
contaminated by spatially omitted variable bias. This chapter addresses spatially omitted
variable bias and tests for yardstick competition using spatial econometric techniques.
The results show that interjurisdictional competition does not depress the use of an
income tax once spatial dependence is taken into account. In addition, there is evidence
of positive yardstick competition between neighboring districts. The primary factor found
to depress income tax usage is the amount of business property within the school district,
suggesting that school district residents would rather attempt to export a portion of their
tax burden onto non-resident property owners rather than levy an income tax for which
they would bear the entire burden.
Chapter 4 examines the return to increases in human and physical capital across
nations. Early research showing a relationship between education and economic growth
led development economists to focus on human capital in addition to physical capital as
primary inputs into stimulating growth in developing countries (Coyne and Boettke
2006). The World Bank, for example, encouraged high levels of government investment
in primary schooling in an attempt to increase human capital levels, leading to a
tremendous expansion of schooling in nearly all developing countries (Easterly 2001).
Unfortunately, this increase in education has not uniformly led to increased economic
growth. Some countries, like Taiwan, greatly increased education levels and did well
economically while other countries such as Zambia stagnated. What makes investment in
human (and physical) capital effective in some countries and not in others?
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In this essay I address this question by considering the institutional context of
investment in human and physical capital. Societal payoffs to investment in human
capital are largely dependent on the institutional context in which those investments
occur. Consider two countries with equal levels and productivity of human capital
investment but vastly different institutional quality. In the country with good institutions
such as the rule of law and minimal government intervention into the economy,
additional human capital will generally be employed towards positive-sum activities. It is
the generation and exploitation of these positive-sum entrepreneurial opportunities that
results in economic progress. Conversely, in the country with poor economic institutions,
human capital is more likely to be employed towards zero-sum or negative-sum
economic activities. While the educated might benefit personally from their additional
education, the exploitation of the mostly negative-sum opportunities available to them in
a bad institutional environment will result in economic regress.
A theoretical model is developed that allows the effect of changes in output per
worker to vary along with institutional quality. I then test this model empirically using
data on 96 countries from 1980-2000 and find that the effect of changes in human and
physical capital varies considerably with the level of institutional quality. The results
indicate that for countries with the lowest quality institutions the return to investments in
human and physical capital per worker are negative and that there exists some ‘breakeven’ point of institutional quality where returns become positive. The break-even point
for physical capital is lower than for human capital, suggesting that countries with
institutional quality between the two break-even points focus on physical capital instead
of human capital. More importantly, however, these results focus attention towards

9

institutional reform as the key to economic progress so that all countries move above the
break-even point for both forms of capital.

10

Chapter 2
Racial Diversity and School Performance
2.1

Introduction

The impact of racial diversity on school performance has long been a concern of parents
and policymakers. The influence of racial diversity on the academic achievement of
African-American students was at the heart of the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Brown v. Board of Education (Armor 1995). ‘White flight’, where white families move to
segregated communities or enroll their children in private schools, is another historical
manifestation of this concern (Fairlie and Resch 2002). More recently, the public policy
debate surrounding ability tracking, charter schooling, open enrollment, and school
vouchers has been rife with concern over how these policies will impact school racial
composition and resulting academic outcomes (Greene 1999; Renzulli and Evans 2004).
As a result of this concern, a body of research has developed that looks at the effect of
racial ‘peer effects’ on school performance.
Following the Brown v. Board of Education decision, early social science
research focused primarily on the harmful effects of racial isolation on the academic
performance of African-Americans. Two influential reports were Coleman et al. (1966)
and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1967), which found that the racial isolation
experienced by African-American students in segregated schools lowered their academic
achievement. Jenks et al. (1972) finds that desegregation improves black children’s
school performance by two to three percent. Guryan (2004) estimates that half of the
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decline in black dropout rates during the 1970s occurred because of desegregation.
Hoxby (2000b) finds that black third graders perform substantially worse when
surrounded by other black students than in classes that are primarily white. Hanushek,
Kain, and Rivkin (2004) isolate the peer composition of racial diversity and find similar
results, namely that having a higher percentage of black classmates lowers black
academic achievement. Thus positive racial peer effects are the conventional channel
through which racial diversity is thought to affect school performance.
Another channel through which racial diversity could affect school performance is
through the ballot box. There is a growing body of research in international development
demonstrating that racial, ethnic, and linguistic diversity has a negative effect on the
individuals’ willingness to spend on publicly-provided goods like roads and schools.1
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) develop a simple theoretical model showing how
diverse preferences over a publicly-provided good can lead to reduced spending. The
basic intuition behind their model is that diverse communities will have lower public
spending because individuals with preferences vastly different from the median voter will
prefer to keep taxes low and spend their money on private consumption.
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) argue that racial groups often have very
different views on public policies such as bilingual education (see, for example, Leal and
Hess (2000)). In their model, the groups whose preferences are not reflected in school
policy vote for lower spending rather than financially support policies with which they
disagree. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) provide some empirical confirmation of
1

The economic literature primarily uses the term ‘fractionalization’ when discussing diversity. In
the interest of clarity, here I will exclusively use the phrase diversity, even when discussing
papers on racial and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. In most studies, ethno-linguistic diversity
is defined as the probability that two individuals randomly drawn from a jurisdiction are from
different ethno-linguistic groups. See Alesina et al. (2003) for an overview of this research.

12

their theoretical model by showing empirically that cities and counties with high levels of
racial diversity have lower spending on schools, roads, and other publicly-provided
goods. If spending less on schools leads to lower output, their work suggests a different
channel through which racial diversity could lead to lower school performance. 2
Both the peer effect channel and the voting channel are important reasons why
racial diversity might affect school performance. However, these channels are in conflict
since the peer effect channel generally supports the view that integration improves school
performance, while the voting channel proposes that racial diversity lowers it.
Furthermore, the literature on racial ‘peer effects’ is almost exclusively focused on the
effect of racial concentration on the academic success of black students, not on the net
effect of diversity.3 If other students do worse in integrated classrooms, the overall effect
of racial diversity on education outcomes could be negative. Thus when the racial peer
effect literature shows that integration increases test scores for black students, this tells us
little about how racial diversity impacts overall school performance.4
In this paper, I fill that gap by focusing on the net effect of racial diversity on
school performance. Using data on Ohio school districts, I find a consistently negative
relationship between racial diversity and student performance at the district level. I begin
first by describing my data: how the index of racial diversity is constructed, the measure

2

In the international context, the link between spending and school performance is extremely
difficult to test given the lack of consistent test score data. Easterly and Levine (1999) find,
however, that ethno-linguistic diversity is negatively correlated with the years of schooling
people obtain.
3
For example, both Hoxby (2000b) and Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) find that blacks,
Hispanics, and whites all do worse as the percentage of their classmates that are black increases.
This clearly suggests that there might be a trade-off between improved black achievement and
reduced white or Hispanic achievement, although they do not address the net effect.
4
One exception is Angrist and Lang (2004) who find modest positive peer effects for minority
third graders from integration with no negative effects for white students.
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of school district performance, and the independent variables used in the analysis. Then I
present the empirical results using both OLS and IV estimation, demonstrating that the
negative relationship between racial diversity and school performance is healthy to a
variety of different specifications and robustness checks. Finally, I conclude with a
discussion of the policy and research implications of my results.

2.2 Data
I construct my data set from two sources. The first source is the Ohio Department of
Education’s ‘Cupp Report.’5 The Cupp Report summarizes all of the data collected by the
Ohio Department of Education on individual local school districts. The report contains
data on student outcomes, student demographics, teacher demographics, district
spending, revenue, property valuation, and tax information. The second data source is the
U.S. Census Bureau’s special ‘Census 2000 School District Tabulation.’ From the 2000
Census report I obtained racial data on school district residents, the mean household
income within each school district, linguistic diversity, adult education levels, and private
school enrollment by school district. All variables from the ‘Census 2000 School District
Tabulation’ and the ‘Cupp Report’ are for the 1999-2000 school term.6

5

The Cupp Report was renamed in 2006 to ‘Finance and Other Data.’ The most recent version of
the publication formerly known as the Cupp Report can be found online at
<http://www.ode.state.oh.us>.
6
The Cupp Report is not kept historically and is generally published with a two-year lag. Thus
the Cupp Report data for the 1999-2000 school year was collected from the Ohio Department of
Education’s website in early 2002.
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Focusing within one state can be problematic if there is insufficient variation
among school districts within the state.7 Lack of diversity or a few significant outliers can
lead to imprecise or statistically biased results. This is not a problem with Ohio, which is
a large and geographically diverse state containing 612 local school districts. Ohio has
several large metropolitan school districts with over thirty thousand students and
numerous small rural districts with fewer than one thousand students. While over a
quarter of a million students are enrolled in Ohio’s five largest city school districts, over
eighty-five percent of students are enrolled in the remaining suburban, exurban, small
city, and rural school districts. After removing five small rural school districts due to
incomplete data, the final sample contains 607 school districts.8
My variable of primary interest is the degree of racial diversity within a school
district. Intuitively, the racial diversity index measures the probability that two school
district residents drawn randomly will be of different races. The degree of racial diversity
within a school district is calculated using the following formula:
Racial Diversity = 1 − ∑ (Racei )

2

(1)

i

where Racei is the percentage of a school district’s population that identifies itself as
being of that particular race. The racial classifications I use are those presented by the

7

Many states, for example, have only county-level school districts. The observed level of racial
integration across school districts in these states may have less to do with preferences for
integration and more to do with the lack of interjurisdictional competition. Clotfelter (1999), for
example, finds less across district segregation but more within district segregation in the South,
where county-level school districts are the norm.
8
Ohio has four ‘island districts’ that serve children living year-round on resort islands in Lake
Erie. The small size of these districts means that often times an entire grade level is comprised of
only one student. For this reason, the Ohio Department of Education censors data on these school
districts due to privacy concerns. College Corner Local School District was removed because it is
a combined Ohio/Indiana school district and thus represents a blending of both states financial
and property tax systems.
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U.S. Census Bureau to individuals on the census form. There are seven racial
classifications in the 2000 Census School District Tabulation: White, Black, Asian and
Pacific Islander, American Indian, Native Hawaiian, Some Other Race Alone, and Two
or More Races. A completely racially-homogenous school district would have an ethnic
diversity score of zero. A school district whose population was equally split between two
races would have a racial diversity score of 0.5.9 A district where each racial
classification was one-seventh of the population would have a score of 0.857.
Admittedly, these racial classifications do not directly correspond to individuals
notions of race. There is, for example, no category for ‘Hispanic.’ The Census Bureau
does not ask individuals if they are ‘Hispanic’ in the context of asking about an
individual’s race. That information is obtained from questions on place of origin. Alesina,
Baqir and Easterly (1999) provide some evidence that the category ‘Some Other Race
Alone’ is, for all intents and purposes, equivalent to Hispanic.10 In addition, the treatment
of multiracial individuals as having a separate racial identity is problematic. Individuals
identifying themselves as multiracial for the purposes of the Census probably do not
consider ‘multiracial’ interests or have a ‘multiracial’ perspective when at the ballot box.
Multiracial individuals are likely to have preferences that are closely aligned to another
racial classification because of cultural or identity reasons. Given the impossibility of

9

(0.5^2) + (0.5^2) = 0.5.
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) argue that their racial classification of ‘Other’ is essentially
Hispanic, given that the correlation between the two Census Variables is 90 percent. They do not
include a separate category for multiracial individuals, however, so it is not clear if their ‘Other’
classification is identical to the classification ‘Some Other Race Alone’ or if it also includes
multiracial individuals. The high correlation between Hispanic and ‘Other’ suggests that they did
not include multiracial individuals with ‘Other.’
10
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knowing the proper allocation of multiracial individuals among the basic racial
classifications, I keep the category Two or More Races separate.11
District-level racial diversity has considerable variability in Ohio. The most
racially-homogenous district in the state is Jennings Local School District in Putnam
County, a primarily rural area located in Northwest Ohio. During the 2000 Census, 1905
of the district’s residents where white and four of the districts residents were Asian,
which gave the district a racial diversity score of 0.005. The most racially-fractionalized
school district in the state is its largest, the Cleveland Municipal School District, with a
score of 0.567. The average school district in the state has a racial diversity score of
0.102 and the standard deviation of this variable is 0.109.
The presence of a large urban school district, such as Cleveland, as the most
racially-diverse school district in the state could lead to the conclusion that racial
diversity is a proxy for large, predominantly poor, urban school districts. A look at
racially-diverse school districts reveals that this might not be the case. While large urban
school districts such as Akron, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Columbus, Toledo, and
Youngstown are among the most racially-diverse school districts in the state, they are
sprinkled around middle-to high-income suburban districts such as Shaker Heights
School District in Cleveland. Shaker Heights High School was recently cited by the Wall
Street Journal as being one of the top feeder schools to elite colleges (Bernstein 2004)
and its racial diversity attracts families to the area with a preference for integration
(Brand-Williams 2002). The simple correlation between racial diversity and median

11

Exclusion of the category Two or More Races from the calculation of the racial diversity
variable does not change the results presented in the paper.
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income per taxpayer in a school district is a negative 0.014 and is not statistically
significant.12
My primary dependent variable is the percentage of school district students
passing the ninth grade math proficiency test during 1999-2000 school year. In Ohio, all
students are required to take and pass five subject areas tests beginning in ninth grade in
order to matriculate with a regular diploma.13 During the 1999-2000 school year, tests
were administered in math, reading, writing, citizenship, and science. In the interests of
parsimony, I focus only on one test – the ninth grade math exam.14 The proficiency test
scores from other ninth grade tests were used, however, to check the math test results
against alternative definitions of school performance. The outcomes of a baseline
regression employing the four other tests as a dependent variable are presented in
Appendix Table 1.15
In addition to using racial diversity by school district to explain passage rates on
statewide math exams, I include control variables representing family, community, and
school influences that are conventional in the literature (Hanushek 2002). A full list of all
of the variables is included in Table 2.1 along with descriptive statistics. Median income
per tax return in the school district is included in the basic specification to account for
12

The null hypothesis of zero relationship cannot be rejected at the ten percent level of
significance (z critical value of 0.334).
13
Ohio’s testing system has subsequently been revamped and the test required for graduation is a
new tenth grade proficiency exam.
14
The math test was chosen for two reasons. First, it is the most objective of the five exams.
Second, historically it is the most difficult of the tests. Fisher (2001) notes that of the 2,678
students unable to graduate with their class because they failed one or more portions of the test,
1,888 failed the math portion.
15
All of the measures of school performance are level scores instead of value-added scores. This
could be problematic if value-added scores are a more appropriate measure of school
performance. Brasington (1999) tests 37 different measures of school performance and finds that
the measures of school performance that are capitalized into home prices are level scores not
value-added scores, suggesting that use of level-scores is appropriate.
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family and background effects (Goldhaber and Brewer 1997). School-related inputs are
district spending per pupil (Hedges and Greenwald 1996; Hanushek 1997), the studentto-teacher ratio (Krueger 2003), the average salary of classroom teachers, and the
percentage of classroom teachers with up to four years of experience (Rivkin, Hanushek,
and Kain 2005).
Table 2.1
Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Variable

Definitions

Mean (S.D.)

Racial Diversity 2000

See text for definition

0.101 (0.109)

Racial Diversity 1990

See text for definition

0.077 (0.096)

Linguistic Diversity

See text for definition

0.128 (0.064)

Income Diversity

Mean household income / median household income

1.214 (0.104)

Black

% of Black district residents

0.037 (0.091)

Math

% of district students passing 9th grade math test

0.769 (0.117)

Science

% of district students passing 9th grade science test

0.827 (0.096)

Reading

% of district students passing 9th grade reading test

0.928 (0.054)

Citizenship

% of district students passing 9th grade citizenship test 0.857 (0.081)

Writing

% of district students passing 9th grade writing test

0.936 (0.050)

Graduation Rate

% of Fall 1996 9th grade class graduating in 2000

0.863 (0.090)

Spending Per Pupil

School district spending per pupil

$6,662 (1,142)

Attendance

% of district students in attendance on an average day 0.948 (0.013)

Teacher Inexperience

% of teachers with 4 or fewer years of experience

0.227 (0.080)

Pupil/Teacher Ratio

Enrollment / classroom teachers

18.28 (2.045)

Average Teacher Salary Average salary of classroom teachers in the district

$39,320 (4,908)

Income

Median income per tax return filed within district

$30,571 (6,411)

College

% of district residents 25 & older with at least a BA

0.172 (0.122)

Free or Reduced Lunch % of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch

0.212 (0.143)

District Size

Number of students enrolled in the district

3,008 (5,274)

Density

District population / district square mileage

778 (2,405)

Private School

% of 5-17 year-olds attending private schools

Note: All observations are for the 1999-2000 school year unless otherwise noted.
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0.102 (0.075)

Population density has been found to influence student outcomes although the
exact reason is unclear (Driscoll, Halcoussis, and Svorny 2003). Driscoll, Halcoussis, and
Svorny (2003) hypothesize that there is a negative relationship between population
density and school performance because it is more difficult to educate in urban schools.
District size is included to account for possible diseconomies of scale with respect to
school district size. A large number of studies find a negative relationship between school
district size and student performance (Fox 1981; Niskanen 1998; Driscoll, Halcoussis,
and Svorny 2003).16 Finally, attendance is included to account for the fact that school
districts with higher attendance rates have higher test scores (Lamdin 1996).

2.3 OLS Results
Figure 2.1 depicts a simple negatively-sloped regression line fitted between district
passage rates on the ninth grade math test and racial diversity. In order to test this
observed relationship econometrically, I estimate the following model using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS):
X

SCHOOLPERFORMANCEi = β 0 + β 1 RACIALDIVERSITYi + ∑ B x Z x ,i + ε

(2)

x =1

where SCHOOLPERFORMANCEi is the passage rate on the ninth grade math
proficiency test in district i for the 1999-2000 school year; RACIALDIVERSITYi is the
degree to which the residents of school district i are divided among different racial
categories; and Zi is a vector of control variables representing school, community, and

16

For a recent contrary view, see Heinesen (2005).
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family influences for each district. β 1 is the coefficient of primary interest as it measures
the impact of racial diversity on the measure of school performance.

Figure 2.1
Racial Diversity and School Performance
1

9th Grade Math Test Passage Rates
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The OLS regression results are presented in Table 2.2, which provide preliminary
evidence that racial diversity is negatively related to school performance. A baseline
regression is presented in Column 1 of Table 2.2. This basic model does a good job,
explaining nearly 60 percent of the variation in passage rates on the ninth grade math
proficiency test across school districts. The key variable of interest, racial diversity, is
negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. The racial diversity variable
theoretically varies from complete homogeneity at zero to perfect heterogeneity at one,
making interpretation of the coefficient on racial diversity fairly simple.
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Table 2.2
Racial Diversity and District Math Scores: OLS Estimates
1
2
3
Constant
-2.65 ***
-1.76 ***
-1.75 ***
(6.13)
(3.96)
(3.89)
Racial Diversity 2000
-0.2805 ***
-0.2431 ***
-0.2423 ***
(5.85)
(5.12)
(5.12)
Expenditure Per Pupil
-0.0085 **
-0.0052
-0.0049
(2.07)
(1.24)
(1.13)
Income
0.0062 ***
0.0005
0.0004
(8.11)
(0.49)
(0.40)
Attendance
3.5363 ***
2.7932 ***
2.8042 ***
(7.82)
(6.21)
(6.21)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio
-0.0054 ***
-0.0038 *
-0.0038 *
(2.60)
(1.93)
(1.91)
Average Teacher Salary
0.0023 **
0.0007
0.0007
(2.15)
(0.64)
(0.66)
Teacher Inexperience
-0.1178 **
-0.1099 **
-0.1095 **
(2.49)
(2.39)
(2.37)
Density
-0.0032
-0.0035
-0.0036
(1.27)
(1.45)
(1.45)
District Size
-0.00002
-0.00009
-0.0001
(0.02)
(0.12)
(0.13)
College
0.2094 ***
0.2202 ***
(4.51)
(3.70)
Lunch
-0.2141 ***
-0.2102 ***
(4.16)
(3.98)
-0.0130
Income Diversity
(0.26)
Linguistic Diversity
-0.0134
(0.21)
Number of Observations
607
607
607
R-squared
0.59
0.62
0.62
Note : Expenditure Per Pupil, Income, Average Teacher Salary, Density, and District
Size in thousands.
Absolute value of heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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The coefficient on racial diversity from specification 1 (-0.2805) suggests that a
move from complete racial homogeneity to the racial diversity of the Mount Healthy
School District (0.498) would lower a district’s passage rates on the ninth grade math
proficiency test by nearly 14 percentage points. Calculated at the mean, that represents a
decline in the average district’s passage rates on the ninth grade math proficiency exam
by over one standard deviation. Note, however, that a movement in a district’s racial
diversity score by 0.5 would represent a five standard deviation change. So while the
effect of racial diversity on school performance is negative and significant, short-run
changes in the racial composition of school districts are unlikely to have a significant
effect on test scores. A school district moving one standard deviation away from
complete homogeneity is expected to observe a decline in the passage rate on the ninth
grade math test by 2.8 percentage points. To put this in context compared to another
explanatory variable, a one standard deviation decline in a school district’s attendance
rate is associated with a 4.6 percentage point fall in math test scores.
Notably, racial diversity is negatively associated with district passage rates

holding school spending constant. This provides some indirect evidence that the effect of
racial diversity on school performance occurs directly rather than flowing through its
negative effect on school spending. Whether this is because of negative peer effects or
some other channel is difficult to discern given the methodological approach.
In column 2 of Table 2.2, I control for additional socioeconomic variables that
might influence school performance to see if this observed relationship between racial
diversity and school performance is robust to alternative specifications. The new controls
added to specification 2 are the percentage of district residents with at least a bachelor’s
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degree and the percentage of district students eligible for free or reduced price lunch. The
percentage of school district residents over 25 with at least a bachelor’s degree is
obtained from the 2000 Census School District Tabulation and the percentage of district
students eligible for free or reduced price lunch is obtained from the Cupp Report.
Both additional variables are statistically significant at the one percent level. As
expected, the greater the percentage of school district residents with at least a bachelor’s
degree, the higher the district’s passage rate on the ninth grade math exam. Conversely,
the higher the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch the lower a
school district’s passage rate on the exam. The impact of racial diversity is reduced
slightly by the introduction of these additional variables but remains statistically
significant at the one percent level. Here, a district moving from complete racial
homogeneity to the middle of the racial diversity spectrum (0.5) is associated with a 12
percentage point decline in district passage rates.
The third column of Table 2.2 provides a final check on the robustness of the OLS
results by adding two more explanatory variables to the model. It is possible that in
addition to being fractionalized by race, individuals might be fractionalized by class or
income. To account for possible stratification of individuals by income, the ratio between
the mean and median income in a school district is used as a measure of income
diversity.17 The second explanatory variable is the degree of linguistic diversity across
school district households. Calculated in a manner identical to the racial diversity

17

The ratio of mean to median income is used here instead of a measure similar to the racial
diversity variable due to the limited nature of income data for school districts. Here mean income
per school district comes from the 2000 Census and median income by school district comes from
the Cupp Report.
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variable, this variable measures the degree to which individuals in a school district are
separated by language barriers.18
The inclusion of these additional variables does not change the finding of a strong
negative relationship between racial diversity and school performance. The coefficient on
racial diversity is nearly identical to the coefficient from the second specification and
remains significant at the one percent level. Moving from racial homogeneity to racial
diversity of 0.5 is associated with a 12 percentage point decline in math test passage
rates. Both the income diversity and linguistic diversity variable are not statistically
significant at conventional levels.

2.4 IV Results
It is possible that the direction of causation does not run just from racial diversity to
school performance but also from school performance to racial diversity. School districts
could become racially fractionalized if household migration in response to school
performance is not uniform by race. While it is clear that public school performance is
important in intraurban migration (Jud and Bennett 1986), there is little evidence that
racial groups systematically differ in their response to school performance.19
However, differences across racial groups in response to school performance are
not necessary to generate changes in diversity. Even if blacks and whites have similar
18

This variable is calculated from the 2000 Census School District Tabulation (Table P2). Only
households that are ‘linguistically isolated’ are calculated as separate groups.
19
There is some evidence that Blacks and Whites do systematically differ in residential location
patterns. South and Crowder (1997), using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
provide some evidence of these differences. They find that even after standardizing for racial
differences in income blacks are far less likely to move from central cities to the suburbs than are
Whites. This could be the result of residential housing discrimination or because of different
tastes for urban and suburban living.
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residential mobility responses to school district performance, school district racial
diversity can change solely because the racial composition of new district residents
differs from the current composition. Consider the case of a racially diverse suburban
school district surrounding a racially homogenous city school district. Since a large
portion of intrametropolitan moves are ‘up and out’ (Bier 2001), the suburban district
could become even more fractionalized over time even if blacks and whites move out of
the district at the same rate. This is because the composition of new residents differs from
the composition of exiting residents.
Even if changes in school district performance do lead to changes in racial
diversity, the direction of this change is not clear in advance. Household mobility in
response to school district performance could either increase or decrease diversity
depending upon the current racial composition of the school district. A situation where a
large number of white residents moved and were replaced by black residents could result
in a school district become less fractionalized, if black households already comprised a
majority share of households within the school district.
Looking at the change in racial diversity over time, Ohio school districts were
more racially fractionalized in 2000 than in 1990 as the racial composition of the state
changed. The average school district in 1990 had a racial diversity score of 0.077. By
2000, that number had changed to 0.101. The correlation between a school district’s 1990
graduation rate and the change in racial diversity among district residents from 1990 to
2000 is a positive 0.0515.20 It appears that better school districts in 1990, as measured by
graduation rates, actually became more fractionalized, although the correlation between
20

Graduation rates were used instead of math test scores because Ohio had no standardized
statewide testing system in place during the 1989-1990 school year.
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these two variables in not statistically significant.21 This provides some evidence that
endogeneity is not a problem.
As an additional check against the possibility that endogeneity is biasing the OLS
results, I follow Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) and instrument for racial diversity
using lagged values of school district racial diversity.22 Each of the three specifications in
Table 2.2 was re-estimated, with the 1990 racial diversity variable taking the place of the
year 2000 measure. Table 2.3 contains the IV results, which seem to indicate that
endogeneity was biasing the OLS estimates presented in Table 2.2 downward. That is,
rather than overstating the effect of racial diversity on school performance, the OLS
estimates understate the effect of racial diversity on school performance. This is
consistent with the fact that better performing school districts in 1990 saw increases in
racial diversity over the subsequent decade.
Instrumenting for racial diversity also increases the economic significance of
racial diversity. The coefficients on racial diversity for all three specifications increase
substantially after instrumentation. Using the coefficient estimate on racial diversity from
specification 1, a move from racial homogeneity to a racial diversity score of 0.5 is
associated with a 16.5 percentage point decline in district passage rates on the math
proficiency exam. This represents a 2.5 percentage point increase over the corresponding
estimate from the OLS results.

21

The null hypothesis of zero relationship cannot be rejected at the ten percent level of
significance (z critical value of 1.27).
22
The Census Bureau prepared the special school district tabulation for the first time for the 1990
Census thus school district data such used to calculate the racial diversity variable is not available
for years prior to 1989-1990 school year. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) were able to employ
data from the 1970 Census because their paper only looked at education spending at the city and
county level.
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Table 2.3
Racial Diversity and District Math Scores: IV Estimates
1
2
3
-2.68 ***
-1.81 ***
-1.8036 ***
Constant
(6.15)
(4.05)
(3.94)
-0.3298 ***
-0.2786 ***
-0.2779 ***
Racial Diversity 1990
(5.65)
(4.72)
(4.75)
-0.0069 *
-0.0039
-0.0036
Expenditure Per Pupil
(1.66)
(0.93)
(0.84)
0.0059 ***
0.0006
0.0006
Income
(7.88)
(0.59)
(0.50)
3.5818 ***
2.8567 ***
2.8653 ***
Attendance
(7.88)
(6.32)
(6.27)
-0.0054 ***
-0.0040 **
-0.0039 **
Pupil/Teacher Ratio
(2.62)
(1.98)
(1.97)
0.0019 *
0.0004
0.0004
Average Teacher Salary
(1.74)
(0.35)
(0.37)
-0.1490 ***
-0.1376 ***
-0.1371 ***
Teacher Inexperience
(3.21)
(3.03)
(3.00)
Density
-0.0030
-0.0033
-0.0033
(1.07)
(1.24)
(1.24)
District Size
0.00008
-0.00002
-0.00003
(0.09)
(0.02)
(0.03)
0.1914
0.2016 ***
College
(4.05)
(3.33)
-0.2109 ***
-0.2072 ***
Lunch
(4.06)
(3.92)
-0.0123
Income Diversity
(0.25)
Linguistic Diversity
-0.0112
(0.17)
Number of Observations
607
607
607
R-squared
0.59
0.62
0.62
Note : Expenditure Per Pupil, Income, Average Teacher Salary, Density, and District
Size in thousands.
Absolute value of heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
The fact that the relationship between racial diversity and school performance is
consistent across all specifications in the OLS regressions provides some assurance that
the association between the two variables is not spurious. The IV results provide some
additional confidence that the relationship between racial diversity and test scores are not
contaminated by endogeneity. Two possible concerns remain, however, and here I
attempt to address them.
The first potential problem is one raised by Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999),
namely that ethnic diversity might be a proxy for the percentage of the population that is
black. Given that the share of black residents is correlated with racial diversity this is
certainly plausible. At the same time, the implications of the racial diversity variable and
the percentage of residents that are black are much different. Racial diversity treats a
school district with racial shares of 60 percent white, 30 percent black and 10 percent
‘some other race only’ as being equivalent to a school district that is 60 percent black, 30
percent ‘some other race only’ and 10 percent white. Conversely, the percentage black
variable treats the two situations as being quite dissimilar.
As Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) suggest, if percentage black is the ‘true’
variable reducing school performance, the inclusion of it in the regressions in Table 2.3
should cause the coefficient on racial diversity to go to zero. The first column of Table
2.4 shows the results of controlling for the percentage of district residents that are black.
Inclusion of percentage black in the empirical model does lower the coefficient on the
racial diversity variable in all three specifications compared to the results in Table 2.3,
but the variable remains statistically significant at conventional levels across the board.

29

Table 2.4
Racial Diversity and District Math Scores: Sensitivity Analysis
1
2
Constant
-1.82 ***
-1.82 ***
(3.89)
(3.89)
Racial Diversity 1990
-0.1170 *
-0.1188 *
(1.89)
(1.92)
Expenditure Per Pupil
-0.0013
-0.0013
(0.30)
(0.29)
Income
0.0005
0.0005
(0.46)
(0.47)
Attendance
2.8352 ***
2.8358 ***
(6.03)
(6.03)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio
-0.0036 *
-0.0036 *
(1.79)
(1.79)
0.0008
0.0008
Average Teacher Salary
(0.77)
(0.78)
-0.1026 **
-0.1016 **
Teacher Inexperience
(2.32)
(2.29)
Density
-0.0025
-0.0025
(1.35)
(1.31)
0.0003
0.0003
District Size
(0.32)
(0.33)
College
0.1952 ***
0.1962 ***
(3.34)
(3.37)
Lunch
-0.1877 ***
-0.1877 ***
(3.68)
(3.68)
Income Diversity
-0.0140
-0.0136
(0.29)
(0.28)
-0.0541
-0.0453
Linguistic Diversity
(0.86)
(0.69)
Black
-0.0027 ***
-0.0027 ***
(4.86)
(4.80)
-0.0175
Private School
(0.39)
Number of Observations
607
607
R-squared
0.64
0.64
Note : Expenditure Per Pupil, Income, Average Teacher Salary, Density, and District
Size in thousands.
Absolute value of heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.

30

Employing the coefficient on racial diversity from the third specification, a move from
racial homogeneity to a score of 0.5 would result in fall in passage rates on the math
proficiency exam of around 5.5 percentage points.
A second potential problem is the presence of private schooling. Clotfelter (1976)
finds that desegregation has a significant effect on private school enrollment. Racial
integration could lead to lower test scores if integration caused the better students in the
district to respond by switching to private schools. Thus, our results might be showing
that racially diverse school districts have lower test scores not because of the effect of
diversity on the provision of education within the district, but rather because the better
students in the district are attending private schools. The second column of Table 2.4
addresses this issue by including the percentage of district children aged 5-17 that attend
private schools as an independent variable. This 2000 Census variable is not statistically
significant and, more importantly, does not affect the impact of racial diversity on school
district performance. Thus while migration to private schools may be a response to
integration, it is does not influence the relationship between racial diversity and school
district performance.

2.6 Concluding Thoughts
In this article, I demonstrate a negative relationship between racial diversity and school
district performance. A school district moving from perfect racial homogeneity to a
situation where two racial groups that had equal shares (a racial diversity score of 0.5)
could expect a decline in district passage rates on the ninth grade math test of between
5.5 and 16.5 percentage points percentage points. While not insignificant, these results
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should be taken with a grain of salt as a 0.5 change in a school district’s racial diversity
score represents a five standard deviation change. A fairly large one standard deviation
increase in racial diversity is associated with a much smaller decline in district math test
scores of between 1.1 and 3.3 percentage points. At the same time, however, these results
provide the first estimate that the net effect of racial diversity on school performance is
negative. While the empirical approach here cannot identify the exact channels through
which racial diversity lowers school performance, identification of the negative
relationship is an important first step.
This finding suggests that the opportunity exists for improvement in education
outcomes in the most racially diverse schools if ways to mitigate the negative effect of
racial diversity on school district performance can be discovered. It is likely, however,
that overcoming the effect of racially diversity on school district performance will not be
easy or desirable, especially given the alternatives. For example, Alesina, Baqir and
Easterly (1999) note that the results of the ethnic, linguistic, and racial diversity literature
appear to suggest that the solution to low levels of public goods provision is segregation
and decentralization. This, however, is not a tenable solution for two reasons. First,
people value diversity as well as school performance and might be perfectly happy to
trade-off reduced performance for living in an integrated environment. Maximizing
school performance is not the same thing as maximizing utility and many factors go into
deciding where to live and attend school besides school performance (Pritchett and
Filmer 1999). Second, segregation is not ideal in the long-run if integration increases the
speed of preference homogenization (Bénabou 1996).
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My results have three important implications for research on the effects of race on
academic achievement. First, research into the effect of racial concentration on student
achievement needs to consider the voting channel as well as the peer effect channel.
Second, social scientists need to look more closely at the net effect of diversity on student
achievement. The racial peer effect literature seems to be clear that increased diversity is
good for black students. What is not clear is whether increased diversity is good for
students of all racial groups.23 Finally, more work needs to be done on estimating through
which channels diversity effects operate. Does racial diversity could lead to lower net test
scores because the negative voting effect dominates the positive peer group effect? Or is
the voting effect negligible but overall learning lower in diverse districts because there
are both positive and negative racial peer effects and the negative dominates the
positive.24 The answers to these important questions await further research.

23

In fact, the relationship between integration and school performance for black students may not
be linear. Echenique, Fryer, and Kaufman (2006) find that integrated schools often have in-school
segregation that leads to lower test scores. Schools where more than 25 percent of the students are
black are actually more segregated in terms of social interactions than schools with fewer black
students.
24
Hoxby (2000b) finds that black, Hispanic, and white third graders all do worse academically as
the percentage of their classmates that are black increase. Her results are consistent with there
being circumstances where the net effect of increased diversity is negative. The same is true with
Echenique, Fryer and Kaufman (2006), who find that Asians are more likely to have high test
scores when they are segregated within a school.
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Chapter 3
Does Tiebout Move or Vote? Fiscal
Competition, Yardstick Competition, and
Income Tax Use
3.1

Introduction

In his influential 1956 paper, Charles Tiebout suggested that ‘consumer-voter’ mobility
among local governments could approximate a competitive market setting if the number
of local communities was sufficiently large (Goodspeed 1998). Tiebout’s goal was to
show how local public goods could be provided in a world without politics (Fischel
2001). Conventional wisdom among public finance economists is that local governments
do face strong competitive pressures from mobile households (Mieskowski and Zodrow
1989). ‘Voting with your feet’ is thus commonly viewed as being analogous to voting
with your pocketbook in conventional market settings, so much that voting at the ballot
box is often viewed as inconsequential to the level and quality of goods provided by local
governments. Horizontal competition among governments has been found to improve
efficiency in a variety of settings.25
This ‘Tiebout-style’ fiscal competition among local governments is thought to
limit the ability of local governments to levy non-benefit taxes, i.e., taxes where the level

25

In education there is a large literature showing a positive relationship between the degree of
interjurisdictional competition among school districts and school efficiency. See, for example, the
work of Staley and Blair (1995) and Hoxby (2000a). Building off the work of Brennan and
Buchanan (1980) on constraining Leviathan, Stansel (2006) finds slower government growth in
more competitive areas. His work is consistent with previous findings of Schneider (1986) and
Zax (1989).
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of benefits is not commensurate with level of taxation (Oates 1999).26 The mobility of
households prevents local governments from engaging in redistribution because mobile
households will ‘vote with their feet’ and move to a nearby community with less
redistribution. In this manner, fiscal competition among local governments could also
affect the tax structure adopted by local governments. Spry (2005) finds that fiscal
competition for mobile households limits the use of residency-based income taxes. Given
the widely-held view in public finance that governments should diversify across as many
tax bases as possible for revenue stability (the so-called ‘three-legged stool’ analogy),
this finding could have important policy implications.
This paper provides evidence that horizontal competition among local
governments does not act as a constraint on the use of residency-based income taxes.
Caplan (2001) develops a model where the complete capitalization of property taxation
into home prices means that ‘voting with your feet’ cannot be a way for homeowners to
escape unwanted taxation.27 Homeowners have to pay the tax regardless, either directly in
tax payments to the local government, or indirectly, through a lower selling price for their
home.28 Powell (2004) extends Caplan’s findings to include any tax that is capitalized in
housing prices.29

26

I use the terminology fiscal competition, interjurisdictional competition, and ‘voting with your
feet’ interchangeably because all describe the same phenomena where exit to nearby districts
creates competitive pressure. Yardstick competition is different because the competitive process
is through ‘voice’, i.e., politics.
27
See Palmon and Smith (1998) for evidence that property taxes are completely capitalized into
home prices.
28
This is because the new owners recognize the future steam of tax payments associated with
purchasing the home and reduce their willingness to pay by the amount of the discounted future
tax payments.
29
An income tax based on a individual’s residence is capitalized into home prices in a manner
similar to the property tax thus Caplan’s conclusions should hold for the residency-based school
district income tax examined here.
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Caplan (2001) argues that it is the political process that forces local governments
to conform to the preferences of the median voter, not interjurisdictional competition. My
argument is similar, except that here other local governments are important, not as a
means of escape, but as a means of comparison. I argue that yardstick competition among
local governments is a significant factor in the choice of an income tax. Yardstick
competition, formalized by Besley and Case (1995), suggests that voters in one locality
utilize information from surrounding localities in making their decisions. In an approach
similar to the one employed here, Fiva and Rattsø (2007) find that yardstick competition
helps explain local government adoption of the property tax in Norway.
The empirical approach used to identify yardstick competition has the added
benefit of providing unbiased estimates of the effect of fiscal competition among
governments. In the presence of spatial dependence, non-spatial estimates can be biased,
inconsistent, or both (Anselin 1988), thus a finding of spatial interaction casts doubt on
the robustness of variable such as measures of interjurisdictional competition that are
correlated in space. Brasington (2007) demonstrates that failing to account for spatial
dependence among local governments can lead to an upward bias in empirical estimates
of interjurisdictional competition. The statistical and economic significance of fiscal
competition measures often disappear once spatial dependence among local governments
is properly taken into account.
This paper shows that yardstick competition matters in the choice of whether or
not to adopt a residency-based income tax using data on Ohio school districts. This
institutional context was chosen so as to be directly comparable with past research that
finds a significant negative relationship between fiscal competition and tax instruments
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choice (Spry 2005). In addition, I find that failure to account for spatial dependence in tax
instrument choice has biased previous estimates, most notably measures of competition
among local governments. The negative influence of interjurisdictional competition on
income tax usage disappears once spatial dependence is taken into account.
Section 2 presents an overview of the institutional setting and the data. Section 3
provides a first look at possible yardstick competition in the data. Section 4 discusses the
empirical approach adopted to meet the two goals of this paper and then Section 5
follows with the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.

3.2 Data
To investigate the relative role of ‘voting with one’s feet’ and yardstick competition in
the determination of local government tax structure, I look at a cross-section of Ohio
school districts for the 1996-1997 school year.30 Ohio is one of only two states that allow
school districts to choose between a property tax and an income tax. Thus the data set
presents a unique opportunity to study the impact of yardstick and interjurisdictional
competition on local government tax structure. While Ohio school districts are required
to raise revenue through property taxation, in 1989 the Ohio state government gave
school districts the option of also levying a residency-based income tax. (Busch, Stewart,
and Taub 1999). That first year 17 school districts received voter approval to tax income
and by the 1996-97 school year 119 of the 611 school districts in the state used the
income tax.

30

As this paper is, in part inspired by and a comment on the work of Spry (2005), the year of
analysis and variable choices are initially chosen so as to be as directly comparable to his results
as possible.
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The dependent variable for the analysis is a binary variable equaling one if a
school district utilized an income tax during the 1996-97 school year and zero if a school
district did not. Following Spry (2005), fiscal competition or ‘voting with one’s feet’ is
measured as the number of other school districts within ten miles of a district.31 This
variable can be thought of as representing the ‘cost’ of voting with one’s feet. As the
number of nearby districts increases, the cost of finding a nearby district to move to falls
and reduces the ability of localities to extract revenue from high-income taxpayers. Thus
the hypothesized relationship between the number of districts within 10 miles and the use
of the income tax is negative.32
I follow Spry (2005) in my choice of explanatory variables in order to facilitate
direct comparison of estimated parameter coefficients. Of primary importance in the
choice of tax structure is the ability to export the tax burden of education onto nonresidents, since they cannot vote in district elections. As the income tax is residencybased, the entire burden of the tax falls on district residents unlike the burden of the
property tax which can be exported to some extent onto non-resident landowners and
consumers. For example, Norstrand (1980) and Sjoquist (1981) find that local
governments are more likely to use the property tax when it is viewed as being exported
onto non-residents. The percentage of taxable property that is business property
(commercial, industrial, or public utility) is included to measure the ability of a
community to export the property tax burden. The greater the percentage of property
31

Originally calculated by Spry (2005), the variable is measured as the number of districts whose
geographic center is ten miles from the geographic center of the district being analyzed.
32
Another measure of interjurisdictional competition that is frequently used is a Herfindahl index
measuring the local government’s share of the total city or MSA government in terms of
population or land area. Hall (2006) confirms Spry’s (2005) finding that Tiebout mobility matters
using a similar data set but measuring the degree of interjurisdictional competition using a
Herfindahl index.

38

within a school district that is business, the lower the probability should be that it would
use the income tax since doing so for any fixed level of spending would likely increase
the burden on local voters. The percentage of taxable property that is mineral is included
for similar reasons and with similar expectations regarding its sign.
The percentage of property that is in agricultural use is included to account for the
fact that farmers are generally property-rich but income-poor and thus would likely vote
for an income tax over a property tax of a similar amount.33 Shock (2004-2005) analyzes
voting behavior in over 1,200 school district elections in Ohio and finds that the
percentage of agricultural property strongly predicts the passage of an income tax. A
positive relationship is also expected between the percentage of a school district’s
residents that are renters and the school district income tax. Shock (2004-2005) finds this
relationship in his study of voting behavior but Spry (2005) finds the opposite
relationship (although the finding is not statistically significant).
There is a large literature showing the effect of the elderly on school spending
(Button 1992; Poterba 1997; Berkman and Plutzer, 2004; Brunner and Baldson 2004).
There are two reasons to think that elderly voters would be in favor of an income tax.
First, elderly homeowners are likely to see their tax burden fall when the income tax is
used because senior citizens tend to have lower incomes and higher property values.
Second, elderly homeowners are more likely than the average homeowner to own their
home outright. Thus their property tax payments are lump-sum payments to the auditor
instead of being collected with their mortgage payment and being held in escrow. The
fiscal illusion created by paying property taxes together with the mortgage is reduced for
33

The classification of property that is excluded to prevent singularity is the percentage of
property that is residential.
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many elderly taxpayers, thus they may be more anti-property tax than would be explained
by the first reason.
From the perspective of the median voter, the likelihood of an income tax being
utilized is expected to decline as the ‘price’ of the income tax increases to the median
voter. The income tax price for the median voter is calculated by multiplying one
thousand times the median adjusted gross income in a school district divided by the total
adjusted gross income in the school district. The higher the income tax price to the
median voter, the less likely it is that a school district will utilize the income tax. The
median voter pays property taxes as well, thus the property tax price of taxation is likely
to influence the adoption of an income tax. The property tax price is calculated as the
median price of owner-occupied housing in the school district times the residential
assessment ratio divided by total property tax value in the district.34 As the property tax
price to the median voter increases, use of the income tax is expected to increase.
The final two explanatory variables included in the benchmark analysis are
variables used in previous research: the percentage of district residents that live in a rural
area, and a binary variable equaling one if the school district is located inside a local
government that also levies a local income tax.35 Rural residency is thought to be
positively correlated with the adoption of a school district income tax beyond being
involved in agriculture although a theoretical reason has not yet been given. Perhaps nonfarmer rural voters tend to identify with the interests of their neighbors engaged in

34

In Ohio, the assessment ratio on real property is 35 percent. Homes are appraised every six
years in Ohio at full market value, thus 35 percent of the full market value of a home represents
its taxable value.
35
The borders of school districts and municipal governments in Ohio are not contiguous, thus this
measure is imprecise because it only reflects if a portion of school district residents have to pay a
municipal income tax. Unfortunately, the data do not exist to calculate a more precise figure.
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agriculture, or are like the elderly in that they tend to have more property than income.
The binary variable called ‘city tax’ is thought to measure competition among local
governments for the income tax base. The expected sign on this variable is ambiguous.
Spry (2005) makes the case that the expected relationship is negative because use of the
income tax by local cities would ‘crowd out’ attempts by the school district to adopt the
tax. He finds, however, that the relationship between the city tax and the school district
tax is positive. This finding is not inconsistent with yardstick competition in that voters
observing an income tax in use at the municipal level have information on its positives
and negatives. If the benefits outweigh the positives, the relationship between city tax and
school district income tax adoption will be positive.
The data come from three sources. Demographic variables on school district
residents were obtained from the National Center for Education Statistics (1994) ‘School
District Data Book.’36 The publication tabulates school district information for all U.S.
school districts from answers on the 1990 Census long form. Data on assessed valuation
by property type and school district income tax information comes from various
publications of the Ohio Department of Taxation (2007) and the Ohio Department of
Education (2007).37 The number of school districts within 10 miles was calculated by
Spry (2005) using Geographic Information System maps from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Data on the median home value and median income in a school district, used to calculate

36

The original school district data book came on 44 CD-ROMs from the National Center for
Education Statistics. The National Bureau of Economic Research has purchased and made
available a more user-friendly version of the data at: www.nber.org/sddb/.
37
A full description of the publications used to calculate the fiscal variables can be found in Spry
(2005, Table 1), but this data appears to now be exclusively available online at:
www.tax.ohio.gov/divisions/tax_analysis/tax_data_series/school_district_data/publications_tds_s
chool.stm.
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the property-tax price and income tax price variables, were obtained from the Ohio
Department of Education (2007). Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the variables.
Table 3.1
Summary Statistics for Ohio School Districts, 1996-97 School Year
Variable

Mean

Min

Max

Standard
Deviation

0.20
4.21
0.36
0.00
0.11
0.24
0.23
0.40
0.24
0.54
0.64

0
0
0.050
0
0
0.051
0
0.004
0
0
0

1
19
0.88
0.04
0.47
1
0.45
41.67
2.54
1
1

0.397
3.536
0.146
0.005
0.107
0.099
0.055
1.746
0.233
0.413
0.481

School District Income Tax
Number of Districts Within 10 Miles
Business Property %
Mineral Property %
Agricultural Property %
Renters %
Elderly %
Income Tax Price
Property Tax Price
Rural %
City Tax

3.3 Follow My Neighbor: A First Look
Figure 3.1 shows a map of Ohio school districts. The grey districts are those that were
using the school district income tax to raise revenue during the 1996-1997 school year.
As noted by Spry (2005), the school district income tax appears to be clustered primarily
in rural areas with less interjursidictional competition. This would appear to be consistent
with the income tax being adopted in locations where there is a greater cost to ‘voting
with your feet.’
A process where district residents observe an income tax in use in nearby districts
and vote for its adoption in their home district is consistent with this clustering of districts
as well. The previous literature has found a positive relationship between the property tax
price the median homeowner faces and the probability of adopting an income tax.
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Districts with high property tax prices and without other factors found to depress income
tax adoption such as a large amount of business tax property were likely to have been
‘first adopters’ when Ohio’s school districts were first given the ability to tax income in
1989.
Figure 3.1
Ohio School Districts with an Income Tax, 1997

Note: Districts in gray are those using the school district income tax during the 1996-97 school year.

A good example of this would be in Mercer County in the western part of Ohio on
the Indiana border. The first district in the area to adopt an income tax was the Coldwater
school district in 1990. The property tax price facing the median homeowner in
43

Coldwater was 0.71, two standard deviations above the state mean. In 1991, neighboring
Fort Recovery joined them in using the income tax (property tax price 0.45). Two other
neighboring districts with property tax prices of 0.36 and 0.09 joined them in 1996. Thus,
by 1997 four out of the six school districts in the county had adopted a school district
income tax.
Figure 3.2 graphically presents this adoption process for Mercer County with the
number of districts in the county is presented on the y-axis and the year is on the x-axis.
The figure shows that as time progresses from 1989, the number of districts in the county
using an income tax to raise revenue goes from zero to four.

Figure 3.2
Income Tax Use in Mercer County, 1989-1997
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Figures 3.3-3.5 present a similar graphical analysis of income tax adoption over
time for three additional counties where the income tax is prevalent. The same pattern
holds. Figure 3.5, for example, shows Miami County (near Cincinnati) starting with zero
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districts using the income tax in 1989 and having one district adopt an income tax per
year until 1994.
Figure 3.3
Income Tax Use in Darke County, 1989-1997
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Figure 3.4
Income Tax Use in Miami County, 1989-1997
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Note that yardstick competition clearly is not the only factor leading to adoption
of an income tax. If it was, then the income tax would eventually spread to all school
districts in Ohio. The factors that are negatively related to income tax adoption, such as
the ability to export part of the tax burden through the taxation of business property,
limits the geographic spread of income tax usage. In Miami County, for example, the
remaining districts that have not adopted the income tax since 1996 have either a very
high income tax ‘price’ or the district has a lot of business property (or both).
Figure 3.5
Income Tax Use in Putnam County, 1989-1997
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The spatial relationship presented in Figure 3.1 showing the usage of the school
district income tax in 1997 presents a picture consistent with spatial dependence in the
choice of an income tax. The graphical time-series evidence presented in Figures 3.2-3.5
provides evidence of yardstick competition in the adoption of the income tax as usage of
the income tax seems to spread geographically within a county over time. While not
proof of yardstick competition in the use of the income tax, these cases are suggestive of
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such a relationship. At the same time, they are not incompatible with there being a
negative relationship between fiscal competition and income tax adoption. To further
isolate statistically the importance of yardstick and fiscal competition in the choice of an
income tax the remainder of the paper discusses and presents an economic analysis
isolating these effects.

3.4 Empirical Approach
The traditional approach to answering the question of the effect of interjurisdictional
competition on income tax adoption would begin by estimating a standard probit model
of the form:
X

SDITi = α + β1WITHIN10i + ∑ β x Z x ,i + ε

(1)

x =1

where SDIT is the binary variable identifying if school district i levied a school district
income tax during the 1996-97 school year; WITHIN10 is the number of school districts
within ten miles of school district i; and Zi is a vector of the remaining explanatory
variables representing other demographic and financial variables at the school district
level. The coefficient of primary interest is β1 , because it measures the effect of Tiebout
competition on the tax structure adopted by school districts. This is the approach adopted
by Spry (2005).
If there is no spatial dependence among school districts, the estimation of
equation (1) by log-likelihood is appropriate. If, however, the likelihood of a school
district adopting an income tax is in part a function of whether one’s neighbors have
adopted an income tax, then the results of the standard probit analysis can be biased,
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inconsistent, or both (Anselin 1988). The geographic pattern of income tax adoption
visible in Figure 3.1 is consistent with there being spatial dependence in the dependent
variable. Brasington (2007) has found that the failure to control for spatial dependence in
education production functions leads to estimates of the effect of interjurisdictional
competition on outcomes being overstated. More generally, failure to take into account
actual spatial dependence potentially biases all parameter estimates and voids subsequent
hypothesis testing. Thus the empirical approach described here not only detects yardstick
competition among local school districts but also corrects for potential bias and erroneous
findings of significance resulting from uncorrected spatial dependence.
Here I address this potential problem by using two different models of spatial
dependence. The first model is a Bayesian version of what is commonly referred to as a
spatial probit lag model or spatial autoregressive probit model (SARP).38 A general
overview of the SARP model can be found in LeSage (1999) but the basic idea can be
obtained by analogy to an autoregressive (AR) model in time-series analysis. Just as an
AR model includes lags over time to reflect that fact that a dependent variable might be
influenced by its own value in previous periods, the SARP model includes lags over
geographic space. In the context of school districts, one spatial lag from district i would
encompass all contiguous neighbors, with each subsequent lag enveloping the neighbors
of district i’s neighbors.
The estimating equation for the SARP model is very similar to the traditional
probit model with one exception:

38

This is sometimes called a ‘spatial latent variable approach.’ See, for example, Fiva and Rattsø
(2007) or Rincke (2006).
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X

SDITi = α + ρ ⋅ W ⋅ SDIT + β 1WITHIN10 i + ∑ β x Z x ,i + ε

(2)

x =1

The primary difference between the traditional probit model and the SARP mode is the

ρ ⋅W ⋅ SDIT term. The W is a ‘spatial weight matrix,’ a symmetrical matrix that
summarizes the spatial configuration of Ohio school districts on a map.39 The number of
rows and columns in the matrix is determined by the number of school districts in Ohio,
in this case 607.40 For each school district in the sample the matrix specifies that district’s
geographic neighbors based on first-degree contiguity.41 For example, if the school
district in row one had only two geographic neighbors, its neighbors would receive ones
in their respective columns. All other columns for row one are given zeros as they
represent the district itself or non-contiguous neighbors. Before being employed in
regression analysis the weight matrix is standardized so that each row equals unity with
each contiguous neighbor receiving equal weight. So for the school district represented in
row one with two contiguous neighbors, each neighbor would have a weight of 0.5. A
district with three neighbors would each receive a weight of 0.33, and so on. This is done
for interpretation reasons.
If ρ, the coefficient on the spatial weight matrix, is statistically different from zero
there is evidence of spatial dependence in the dependent variable. The estimate of spatial
dependence can be thought of as the reaction function of a school district to its own
characteristics and the use of the school district income tax in nearby districts (Brueckner
and Saavedra 2001). Theoretically, yardstick competition can result in the reaction

39

LeSage (1997) provides a good overview of the construction of weight matrixes.
While Ohio had 611 school districts during the 1996-97 school year, four districts had to be
excluded from the analysis because of missing or censored data.
41
There are many other possible weight matrixes. First degree contiguity is the most popular.
40
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function being either positive or negative depending upon parameter estimates, thus
empirical evidence is necessary to determine if the presence of an income tax in
neighboring districts has a positive or negative effect on use of the income tax. Following
Fiva and Rattsø (2007), a value of ρ statistically different from zero is taken as evidence
that yardstick competition matters in the choice of the income tax by school districts.
The Bayesian SARP model is employed to deal with heteroscedasticity introduced
by the non-spherical variance-covariance matrix created by the SARP. In his survey of
different methods of dealing with heteroskedasticity in discrete dependent variable spatial
models, Fleming (2004) concludes that the Bayesian approach pioneered by LeSage
(2000) is the superior approach to dealing with this problem. The advantage of the
Bayesian approach is that it allows for heteroskedastic error terms while making sure that
heteroskedasticity is not leading to inconsistent parameters. An excellent overview of the
Bayesian SARP model can be found in Fiva and Rattsø (2007).
The Bayesian SARP method developed (and explained in greater detail) by
LeSage (2000) is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method using a Gibbs Sampler
process, which is repeated a large number off times to obtain conditional distributions for
the model parameters. The Gibbs Sampler process requires a large number of ‘draws’ to
derive conditional distributions for all the parameters. According to MCMC convergence
diagnostics the process converges after roughly 950 draws with the first 15 ‘burned-off’
to allow the sampler to reach a steady-state. The results here are all based on 1000 draws
with the first 50 excluded.42

42

As a check on the MCMC diagnostics, the baseline model specifications in Table 2 were run
with 5,000, 10,000, and 20,000 draws and the parameter estimates were basically unchanged.
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Relying on a finding that ρ is non-zero and significant in the SARP model as
evidence of yardstick competition is problematic since the SARP model assumes that the
variance-covariance matrix of the error term is not spatially dependent. Spatial
dependence can arise in the error term for many reasons, however, and thus the finding of
yardstick competition might be a ‘false positive’. A frequent cause of false positive is
omitted variable bias caused by an incorrect model specification. Omitted variable bias
will not create a false positive if the omitted variables are not spatially dependent. If,
however, the omitted variables are spatially dependent then they will be picked up in the
error term. Failure to account for spatial error dependence can give rise to the false
positive because the spatial lag term ρ is likely to reflect the uncorrected for spatial error
correlation created by the omitted variables.43 In the case of the linear spatial model there
exist several approaches to addressing this problem.44 Unfortunately, these approaches
are not valid for spatially limited dependent variable models (Fiva and Rattsø 2007).
The second model of spatial dependence employed, the spatial Durbin model,
overcomes this problem. Pace and LeSage (2007) find that estimates from the spatial
Durbin model are not affected by spatial dependence in the error term or the dependent or
independent variables. They conclude that the ability of the spatial Durbin model to deal
with this omitted variable bias provides a strong econometric motivation for its use. Here
I employ a Bayesian probit version of the model, called the Spatial Durbin Probit (SDP)
model, which takes the following form:
X

X

x =1

x =1

SDITi = α + ρ ⋅W ⋅ SDIT + β 1WITHIN10 i + ∑ β x Z x ,i + W ∑ Z x ,i δ x ,i + ε

43
44

See Brueckner and Saavedra (2001, 212) for further discussion of this issue.
Anselin (2002) provides an overview of these procedures.
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(3)

In equation (3), the second Z x matrix is the still the matrix of independent variables only
this time it is multiplied by the spatial weight matrix. In this manner the term corrects for
spatial dependence in the independent variables as well as in the dependent variable. The

δ x coefficients thus pick up the extent to which the demographic variables of nearby
districts influence the decision to adopt an income tax in the original school district. This
approach significantly reduces bias in cross-section results by eliminating spatially
dependent omitted variable bias (Pace, Barry, and Sirmans 1998; Brasington and Hite
2005; Pace and LeSage 2007).45 In the presence of spatial dependence in the error term,
this will be the appropriate specification.46

3.5 Empirical Results
The first objective of the empirical analysis is to test for yardstick competition among
school districts in the choice of the income tax. Recall that if ρ is statistically different
than zero than this will be taken as evidence of yardstick competition. If yardstick
competition is observed, then it is also likely that the estimated coefficients from
traditional probit analyses of tax instrument choice are biased. Thus the second goal of
the empirical analysis is to see, conditional on their being spatial dependence, how the

45

Non-spatially dependent omitted variable bias is still possible, but since the explanatory
variables are the same for the original district as well as the neighbors, most omitted variable bias
is likely to be spatially dependent.
46
There exists a model specifically to correct for spatial error only, the SEM model. Mur and
Angulo (2005) show that the SDP model accomplishes the same thing as a SEM model with the
advantage that it sorts out individual effects in the disturbance term through the use of the
spatially lagged independent variables. The SEM model is more frequently used in the literature;
this is primarily because the SDP model is prone to multicollinearity. Fortunately, analysis of the
BKW (Belsley, Kuhn, and Welsch 1980) influential observation diagnostics finds that
multicollinearity is not a problem.
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conclusions from previous studies on fiscal competition and tax instrument choice are
changed once spatial dependence is fully taken into account. I first estimate the nonspatial probit model similar to the previous literature and then the SARP and SDP
models. Table 3.2 presents the results of these benchmark regressions.
As with regular probit estimation, the coefficients in Table 3.2 are difficult to
interpret. The marginal effect of a change in each independent variable in the probability
that a school district has an income tax is provided to help with interpretation. In spatial
models, the spatial interdependence among observations needs to be corrected for
because a change in the explanatory variable has both a direct and indirect effect.47 The
marginal effects for all spatial models presented in the paper take the ‘spatial multiplier
effect’ into account. The marginal effect of a one standard deviation change in each
independent variable are also calculated and provided in Appendix Table 1 for additional
ease of interpretation.
The non-spatial probit results in column 1 are nearly identical to the previous
literature and are generally consistent with prior expectations.48 Business property
percentage and mineral property percentage are negatively related to the adoption of an
income tax in a statistically significant manner and the property tax price, the presence of
a city income tax, and the percentage of agricultural property are statistically significant
and positively related to the probability of income tax adoption.

47

See Beron and Vijverberg (2004, 174-175) for further explanation of the interpretation of probit
parameters in the spatial context. Basically, the indirect effect arises because a district’s decision
to adopt an income tax determines how your neighbors feel about an income tax, which in turn
affects how the original district feels, which affects the neighboring districts, etc.
48
This should not be surprising as the only difference between Spry (2005) and the present paper
are two observations excluded because of missing data.
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Table 3.2
Fiscal Competition and Tax Instrument Choice: Model Comparisons
Dependent variable: Binary Variable Equaling 1 if Taxing Income
Variable

Non-Spatial Marginal
Probit
Effect

Constant

-0.149
-0.711
(1.267)
Within 10
-0.093 *** -0.019
(2.713)
Property Tax Price
1.264 *** 0.265
(2.202)
Income Tax Price
-0.070
-0.333
(1.291)
% Renters
-0.002
-0.010
(0.009)
City Tax Dummy
0.598 *** 0.126
(3.698)
% Senior Citizens
-0.262
-1.249
(0.854)
% of Agricultural Property
2.901 *** 0.609
(2.861)
% of Mineral Property
-53.264 *** -11.175
(2.909)
% of Business Property
-1.818 *** -0.382
(2.618)
% of Rural Residents
0.273
0.057
(0.835)
Spatial Lag Term ρ

SARP
Model

Marginal
Effect

SDP
Model

Marginal
Effect

-0.223
(0.679)
-0.143 ***
(0.047)
1.781 ***
(0.686)
-0.539 ***
(0.305)
-0.310
(1.334)
0.713 ***
(0.204)
-1.783
(1.992)
2.772 **
(1.434)
-70.338 ***
(26.522)
-2.357 ***
(0.833)
0.232
(0.429)
0.261 ***
(0.061)

-0.026

-0.847
(1.373)
-0.058
(0.072)
0.863 *
(0.531)
-0.091
(0.112)
1.069
(1.552)
0.412 **
(0.238)
0.197
(2.225)
2.321 *
(1.558)
-19.279
(33.232)

-0.236

Lag % Agriculture
Other Spatially Lagged X's

Number of Observations
Psuedo R-squared

607

-0.019
0.248
-0.069
-0.035
0.112
-0.352
0.502
-11.496
-0.388
0.303

0.241
-0.025
0.298
0.115
0.055
0.647
-5.377

-1.775 ** -0.495
(0.957)
0.471
0.132
(0.469)
0.144 *
(0.097)
5.537 **
(3.194)
Yes

607
0.77

0.23

-0.016

607
0.65

* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
In Column 1 the numbers in parentheses are absolute t-statistics. In Columns 2 and 3, posterior
standard deviations. Insignificant spatially lagged independent variables supressed for space.
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The results of the SARP model in Column 2 are very similar. The primary
exception is that the income tax price is now positive and statistically significant at the
one percent level where it was insignificant (but positive) in the non-spatial probit. This
could be as a result of the spatial lag correcting for bias, but it is likely the result of the
Bayesian approach employed in estimating the SARP model. The Bayesian component of
the SARP model attempts to not fit extreme outliers which appear to be driving the
insignificant result for income tax price in Column 1. Estimating Column 1 with a nonspatial Bayesian probit confirms this as the income tax price becomes significant.49
The spatial lag term ρ in the SARP model has a coefficient of 0.261 and is
significantly different than zero, indicating the presence of yardstick competition. The
coefficient suggests that the average correlation between a district’s choice of an income
tax and the weighted average of its neighboring districts choice of an income tax is 0.261.
Unfortunately since the spatial lag term ρ is the coefficient of an unobserved latent
variable the marginal effects of neighboring districts use of an income tax on the
probability of the home district adopting an income tax cannot be calculated (Rincke
2006).
What about the measure of fiscal competition? The number of school districts
within ten miles is negatively and statistically significant related to the probability of
using the income tax, appearing to confirm that as the amount of interjurisdictional
competition increases uses of the income tax declines. The results from the SARP model
in the second column seem to confirm the negative relationship. The number of districts

49

Income tax price seemed to be the only result driven by outliers as all other estimates remain
essentially unchanged in the non-spatial Bayesian probit.
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in ten miles in negative and significant and the marginal effect of the variable is the same
as in the traditional, non-spatial, probit model.
Column 3 presents the results from the SDP model. Recall that spatial Durbin
model controls for spatially dependent omitted variable bias by including the weighted
average of neighboring districts independent variables as well as the dependent variable.
The spatial lag of the percentage of property that is agricultural is significant at the five
percent level providing strong evidence of spatial dependence. In addition, the lag of the
percentage of mineral property barely misses being statistically significant and is quite
large. Controlling for omitted variable bias in the spatially lagged dependent variables
greatly reduces the explanatory power of many of the independent variables. Importantly,
however, the spatial lag term is still positive and statistically significant at the ten percent
level, suggesting that the finding of yardstick competition in the SARP regression was
not spurious.
Most notably, failure to control for spatially dependent omitted variable bias most
likely gave too much explanatory power to the measure of fiscal competition as the
number of districts within ten miles is now statistically insignificant. In addition, the SDP
model results suggest that failure to control for spatial dependence in the error term was
introducing an upward bias in the size of the parameter estimate. Controlling for spatial
dependence reduces the size of the coefficient estimate on the number of districts within
ten miles by over 50 percent. These results are consistent with Brasington’s (2007)
research on interjurisdictional competition and education production. He finds that
coefficient estimates on measures of interjurisdictional competition are statistically
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significant in spatial lag models but that those results disappear in once spatial error
dependence is taken into account.
The effect of controlling for spatial dependence in the error term can perhaps be
seen most prominently in the calculation of marginal effects. For example, not only is
mineral property percentage no longer statistically significant, but the marginal effect of
the variable is less than half of the estimate in either the SARP model or the regular
probit. Appendix Table 2 provides a calculation of the marginal effect a one standard
deviation change in the a school districts mineral property percentage is estimated to
reduce the probability of adopting an income tax by two and a half percentage points, half
of what is predicted in the SARP or standard probit models (Appendix 2). The
importance of not relying solely on parameter coefficients can be seen in the case of the
business property percentage. The estimated parameter coefficient is smaller in the SDP
regression that in the SARP regression, but the marginal effect is now larger. Looking at
Appendix 2, we can see that a one standard deviation change in the percentage of
business property in a school district will reduce the probability that a district will use the
income tax by 7.5 percent, an estimate over 1.5 percentage points higher than similar
calculation from the SARP model.
Other items of interest are that the income tax price is no longer statistically
significant once spatial error dependence is taken into account with the SDP model. The
marginal effect of a one standard deviation change in the income tax price is reduced by
nearly two-thirds over the other two models. Although the variables are not significant, it
should be noted that the percentage of renters and the percentage of senior citizens in a
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school district both changed signs in the SDP model with both now being positive, which
is what theory would predict.
The finding that fiscal competition does not matter once spatial dependence is
taken into account might be a function of how the degree of interjurisdictional
competition is defined. In addition to the number of school districts within ten miles,
Spry (2005) also estimates the number of districts within 12 and 15 miles. Another
definition of fiscal competition frequently used in the literature is a Herfindahl index of
market concentration (see, for example, Borland and Howsen (1996) or Hoxby (2000a)).
Here the Herfindahl index takes the form of:
J

HERF = 1 − ∑ S 2jm

(4)

j =1

where s jm is equal to district j’s share of school enrollment in county m. Using this
formulation a ‘monopoly’ county will have a value of 0 and as perfectly competitive
county would have a score of one.
Table 3.3 presents the results of these alternative regressions employing the
Bayesian SDP model and the same specifications as in Table 3.2 but substituting these
three alternative definitions of interjurisdictional competition for the number of districts
within ten miles. As can be seen in the table, changing the definition of fiscal competition
does not change the results. In all three specifications the new variables are statistically
insignificant. In the case of the within 12 and within 15 miles measures, the marginal
effect is smaller compared to the within 10 mile measures as well. This is to be expected
given the usual assumption that farther away districts would be weaker substitutes.
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Table 3.3
Fiscal Competition and Tax Instrument Choice: Robustness Checks
Dependent variable: Binary Variable Equaling 1 if Taxing Income
Variable
Constant
Within 12

SDP Model
-1.166
(1.315)
-0.005
(0.070)

Marginal
Marginal
Marginal
SDP Model
SDP Model
Effect
Effect
Effect
-0.297

-0.700
(1.493)

-0.217

-0.004
(0.052)

-0.001

Herfindahl Index

Income Tax Price
% Renters
City Tax Dummy
% Senior Citizens
% of Agricultural Property
% of Mineral Property
% of Business Property
% of Rural Residents
Spatial Lag Term ρ
Spatially Lagged X's
Number of Observations
Psuedo R-squared

0.904 *
(0.688)
-0.222 *
(0.387)
1.308
(1.520)
0.437 **
(0.231)
-0.600
(2.309)
2.473 **
(1.531)
-14.604
(30.232)
-1.840 **
(0.918)
0.570
(0.474)
0.145 *
(0.096)
Yes

0.142

-0.001

Within 15

Property Tax Price

0.560
(1.932)

0.230
-0.056
0.333
0.111
-0.153
0.629
-3.717
-0.468
0.145

607

0.823 *
(0.768)
-0.176
(0.472)
1.007
(1.618)
0.461 **
(0.240)
-0.136
(2.36)
2.399 *
(1.476)
-19.197
(32.124)
-2.056 **
(0.984)
0.484
(0.490)
0.161 *
(0.098)
Yes
607
0.69

0.70

0.255
-0.055
0.312
0.143
-0.042
0.742
-5.939
-0.636
0.150

-0.252
(0.815)
0.851 *
(0.565)
-0.112
(0.138)
0.943
(1.495)
0.447 **
(0.232)
0.014
(2.341)
2.355 *
(1.458)
-24.593
(32.067)
-1.861 **
(0.901)
0.448
(0.443)
0.140 *
(0.096)
Yes

-0.064
0.216
-0.029
0.239
0.113
0.003
0.597
-6.235
-0.472
0.114

607
0.68

* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
In Column 1 the numbers in parentheses are absolute t-statistics. In Columns 2 and 3, posterior
standard deviations. Spatially Lagged independent variables included in Bayesian Durbin Probit but
supressed for space. Results consistent with 3rd Column of Table 2.
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Even if these new measures of fiscal competition were statistically significant, a one
standard deviation in each of the measures is estimated to have an extremely small effect
on the probability of adopting an income tax — between six-tenths for the number of
districts within 12 miles and one percent for the Herfindahl measure.
Thus there appears to be little evidence that fiscal competition plays a role in the
tax structure of local school districts once spatial dependence is properly addressed.50 In
addition, the spatial lag term is statistically significant in all three specifications, with
spatial lag estimates ranging from 0.140 to 0.161, providing further evidence to support
the finding of yardstick competition in the choice of an income tax.

3.6

Conclusion

This paper finds evidence of yardstick competition in the choice of Ohio school districts
to adopt an income tax. The parameter on the spatial lag term estimating the degree of
yardstick competition varied from 0.140 to 0.161 across the appropriate specifications.
These findings suggest that the probability of passing an income tax is higher in school
districts whose neighbors already utilize the income tax.
The influence of fiscal competition on the choice among property and income
taxes is the focus of recent empirical research by Spry (2005). He finds a negative
relationship between the degree of interjurisdictional competition and the use of an
income tax by Ohio school districts. After controlling for spatial dependence in the

50

In unreported regressions available from the author, I utilize the weight matrix used by
Brasington (2007) that measures a school district’s five nearest neighbors. The findings are
qualitatively similar using this alternative weighting matrix.
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dependent variable, independent variables, and the error term I find that no statistically
significant relationship exists.
In terms of policy, the findings are straightforward. The degree of
interjurisdictional competition is not what is preventing the use of the income tax in Ohio
school districts. A ‘race to the bottom’ form of tax competition where school districts in
competitive metropolitan areas compete for mobile high-income taxpayers can thus be
ruled out. Instead, the reasons why school districts in Ohio do not adopt an income tax
appear to be rational responses to the preferences of the median voter. If there is a lot of
business property in the district, voters prefer the property tax to the income tax, other
things equal, because of tax burden exportation. In areas with a lot of agricultural
property, voters prefer to adopt an income tax, since farmers usually own more property
than the average citizen but realize less income.
More importantly, my findings are consistent with Brasington (2007) who first
showed that interjurisdictional effects are biased when spatial dependence is not
accounted for. Researchers looking into the effect of interjurisdictional competition on
various outcomes need to account for spatial dependence among governments in order to
avoid having biased, inefficient, and inconsistent parameter estimates. In addition to
adding to the explanatory power of the models, the use of spatial econometrics also led to
significantly more accurate parameter estimates.
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Chapter 4
Institutions, Capital, and Growth
4.1 Introduction51
The causes of economic development have been studied before Adam Smith made his
inquiry into the causes of the wealth of nations. As a field of study, however, economic
development did not really exist until after World War II (Arndt 1997). The first
development economists focused primarily on the accumulation of physical capital as the
driving force in economic growth.52 For example, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Sir Arthur
Lewis, and Walt Rostow all argued that developing countries suffered from a ‘poverty
trap’ where they could not afford to save enough to accumulate the necessary amounts of
human capital to grow (Easterly 2006a). This focus on the accumulation of physical
capital provided the intellectual impetus for the large sums of foreign aid provided to
developing countries by international aid agencies post World War II because aid was
seen as being crucial to giving poor nations the physical capital they needed to break out
of the ‘poverty trap.’ The notion that developing countries are in a poverty trap that
prevents them from accumulating physical capital is still alive today, both in the actions
of the World Bank and IMF as well as in the research of economists such as Jeffrey
Sachs.53

51

This essay draws heavily from a working paper with Russell S. Sobel titled “Institutions,
Capital, and Growth.”
52
One notable exception is Peter Bauer (1948; 1954; 1957) who viewed the accumulation of
capital as an outcome of successful economic performance, not an input.
53
For example, in his book The End of Poverty, Jeffrey Sachs (2005, 56-57) says “This is the
main reason why the poorest of the poor are most prone to becoming trapped with low or
negative economic growth rates. They are too poor to save for the future and thereby accumulate
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In the 1960s and 70s, the pioneering work of Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964)
on human capital caused development economists to augment their standard economic
growth models to allow for human capital investment to play a role. Early research into
the effects of formal education on economic growth found that education seemed to
explain a significant portion of economic growth (Hall 2000). These findings led
development economists to focus on human capital as a primary factor of production
throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Coyne and Boettke 2006). International development
organizations such as the World Bank encouraged high levels of government investment
in schooling in an attempt to increase human capital levels. As a result of these efforts,
there was a tremendous expansion of schooling in nearly all developing countries
(Easterly 2001). According to Pritchett (2001), since 1960 primary enrollments in
developing countries increased from 66 to 100 percent and secondary enrollments rose
from 14 to 40 percent.
There is little evidence to suggest that efforts to increase capital levels in
developing countries, especially in Africa, have been successful in generating growth.
Good historical data on public investment in capital is available for 22 African countries
since 1970. From 1970-1994, those countries received $187 billion in aid and spent $342
billion on public investment, only to achieve zero per capita growth (Easterly 2006b).
The same can be said of the increases in formal schooling stimulated, in part, by foreign
aid. Easterly (2001) details how sub-Saharan African countries had larger increases in
schooling than any other region since 1960. Yet these countries remained mired in
poverty while Asian ‘tigers’ like South Korea and Taiwan had smaller increases in
the capital that could pull them out of their current misery.” For more on the revival of the ‘Big
Push’ and ‘poverty trap’ theories of development, see Easterly (2006b).
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education levels but flourished economically. In cross-country growth regressions,
Pritchett (2001) finds no relationship between increases education and increases in output
per worker. Similarly, Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson (2004) find that the growth of
human capital per worker is not related to per capita GDP growth.54
The macroeconomic evidence is somewhat paradoxical because it is contrary to
the microeconomic evidence that increases in physical and human capital increase
individual productivity and remuneration. After all, it would seem that summing all
individual positives within a country should aggregate to a social positive. Yet it many
countries this is not the case. In this paper I put forth a potential answer to this question
by considering the institutional context of capital accumulation. My thesis is that the
societal payoffs to improvements in the levels of both physical and human capital are
largely dependent on the institutional context in which those investments occur. 55
In countries with good institutions—where the social, political, and legal rules
provide for secure property rights, unbiased contract enforcement, and reliance on market
prices and profits and losses to guide economic activity—investments in capital are both
privately beneficial to individuals and also create a positive return for society as a whole.
In countries with poor institutions, however, the higher returns to investments in rent54

There is a large body of empirical literature showing that initial education levels matter for
economic growth (Barro 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). Pritchett (2001, 381) argues that
these papers are misspecified as growth rates are stationary and the education stock is nonstationary and globally increasing. A stable relationship is thus not possible between education
and growth when formulated in that manner. In addition, such a formulation cannot explain
negative growth rates or the fact that fact that the initial level of education has been rising for
over forty years in sub-Saharan Africa but growth has stagnated or declined.
55
The idea that additional education, in some instances, might actually yield low or negative
social returns is not new. In Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, Milton and Rose Friedman
(1980, 34) suggested that higher education might lead to the disruption of the social order and
political institutions. Griliches (1997) suggests in a footnote that the effect of education on
productivity might be muted in countries where most educated individuals end up working within
governments not known for productivity.
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seeking activities that plunder the wealth of others, through lobbying and lawsuit abuse,
for example—draw significant resources into these privately beneficial, but socially
unproductive activities. Investments in education produce more lobbyists, politicians, and
lawyers, rather than engineers and scientists.56 In the terminology of Baumol (1990), the
allocation of entrepreneurial efforts between productive, positive-sum activities and
unproductive or even destructive, negative-sum activities in a society is a function of the
returns to these alternative activities that are determined by the quality of a country’s
legal and political institutions.
There are two reasons why capital investments in countries with poor institutions
should generate a lower social return. I term these the ‘allocation effect’ and the
‘productivity effect’. The allocation effect is the process described above, in which poor
institutions draw a large proportion of new capital investments into socially unproductive
activities to plunder wealth. Because of this fewer resources are allocated toward
productive activities that generate additions to the country’s economic output.

The

second, productivity effect relates to the ability of a country’s economy to properly
allocate additional capital investments to their highest valued use. When collective
decision making and the political process are used to control prices, regulate business
activities, and enact selective taxes and subsidies that distort the market profit and loss
mechanism, capital investments will simply not be allocated as efficiently toward their
highest valued use. Combined, the productivity and allocation effects result in lower, and

56

There is a clear parallel between our argument and that of Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991)
who take the proportion of students enrolled in law as representative of the societal payoffs to
rent-seeking. They find that countries with a higher proportion of law students have slower
growth than countries and countries with a higher percentage of students studying engineering
grow slower.
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potentially negative, social returns to both physical and human capital investment in
countries with poor institutions.

4.2 Institutions, Capital, and Growth of Output per Worker
The conventional perspective on the marginal effect of increases in physical and human
capital on economic growth is that they have the same marginal effect regardless of the
level of institutional quality. Figure 4.1 illustrates this view. The figure shows the
marginal effect of a change in capital per worker on the change in output per worker
conditional on the level of institutional quality. From this perspective, an additional unit
of capital has the same impact on economic growth whether the country is in a good
institutional environment or a poor one. To put it the context of human capital, an
addition year of education in the Democratic Republic of the Congo would have the same
effect on the growth of output per worker as a year in Australia.
My hypothesis is that this view is incorrect because it ignores the impact of
institutional quality on the productivity and allocation of labor. An additional year of
education in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not the same as an additional year
of education in Australia because of the opportunities provided by the overall institutional
environment.57 The best opportunities for more educated individuals in countries with
low-quality institutions are more likely to be zero-or-negative sum, such as working in
the government bureaucracy. When the institutional environment is ‘bad’, increases in

57

The years of education are also different in that they might come at different levels (primary vs.
secondary) and that the quality of the education surely differs. As described later, the first
problem is dealt with in how measures of education growth are constructed. Correction of the
second problem is hampered by the lack of systematic test score data for a large number of
countries.
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education levels will be less socially productive than in countries with a ‘good’
institutional environment. While individuals will always choose the occupation that gives
them the highest personal return, good institutions create a correspondence between
positive personal and positive social returns.

Figure 4.1
Marginal Effect of Capital on Output per Worker: Conventional View
∂∆YPW ∂∆YPW
,
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10 Institutional
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Quality

In the long-run, the higher payoffs to public sector activity distort the choices
individuals make in the types of education to acquire. Thus in a society where the payoffs
to the private sector are low because of poor institutions but payoffs to the public sector
are high (also because of poor institutions), individuals will tend to invest in human
capital more valued by the public sector. For example, Nobel Laureate Sir Arthur Lewis
discusses in his Nobel Prize lecture how he wanted to be an engineer but could not find
employment in St. Lucie as an engineer because of discrimination, thus he went into
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business studies with the goal of working in the civil service or private sector (Lewis
1992). While both the public and private sector employ engineers, the issue is that in
countries with poor institutional environments the payoffs to being a private sector
engineer will be lower and thus we will get fewer engineers and the ones we do have will
be less alert to positive-sum entrepreneurial opportunities.
Countries with bad institutions have more zero or negative-sum opportunities and
thus the marginal effect of more education could be negative if enough of the additional
education goes into negative-sum activities. Not only are resources being removed from
production in order to increase education levels (in terms of expenditures on education
but also opportunity costs), but if educated individuals move into rent-seeking the
societal payoffs from their education will be negative. At some level of institutional
quality, however, the rewards to positive-sum activities begin to outweigh the rewards to
zero and negative-sum activities and the marginal effect of human capital increases on
growth becomes positive.
Figure 4.2 illustrates this proposed relationship. The marginal effect of an
increase in capital is negative when institutional quality is ‘zero.’ While all societies have
some level of formal or informal institutions, counties like present-day Somalia, Rwanda
or Venezuela would be examples of countries that have extremely low levels of
institutional quality according to most measures. At some break-even level of
institutional quality the allocation of resources between sectors of the economy is
balanced so that net additions to capital neither add to nor diminish output per worker. As
institutional quality rises beyond that break-even point, the additions to capital flow to the
productive sectors of the economy and have a positive contribution to output per worker.
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This view of the role of institutions in channeling increases in capital towards sociallyproductive areas of the economy helps to explain why public investment in human and
physical capital have not uniformly led to increases in output per worker in the
developing world.

Figure 4.2
Marginal Effect of Capital on Output per Worker: Institutional View
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4.3 Theoretical Model
In this section I augment a macroeconomic growth model to incorporate the impact of
institutional quality. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) first augmented the standard
Solow (1956) growth model to include human capital. They consider a standard
aggregate production function given by:
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Yt = At K tα1 H tα 2 Lαt 3

(1)

where Y is output, A is the level of technology that augments physical capital (K), human
capital (H), and labor (L). The production function exhibits the standard assumption of
constant returns to scale ( α1 + α 2 + α 3 = 1 ). Dividing through by L puts (1) in per worker
terms:

yt = At htα1 ktα 2

(2)

This traditional model implicitly assumes an underlying set of good institutions. In our
model, the quality of institutions affects output through the effect that institutions have on
the productivity of human and physical capital. Thus I specify the technology parameter
as:

At = A0 htβ1 ( I − I *) k tβ 2 ( I − I *)

(3)

where A0 represents the basic level of technology, I ∗ represents the ideal institutions
implicitly assumed in the traditional growth model, and I is the country’s current level of
institutional quality. Thus, I-I* measures the degree to which the country’s institutions
fall short of ideal conditions. When I=I*, the model reduces to its standard form in the
previous literature.
Substituting (3) into (2) yields:

y t = A0 htβ1 ( I − I *) k tβ 2 ( I − I *) htα1 k tα 2

(4)

Rearranging:

y t = A0 htα1 + β1 ( I − I *) k tα 2 + β 2 ( I − I *)

(5)

Taking logs:
ln y t = ln A0 + [α 1 + β 1 (I − I *)] ln ht + [α 2 + β 2 (I − I *)] ln k t
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(6)

Here I follow Pritchett (2001) in focusing on explaining the growth of output per worker
using the growth of physical and human capital per worker. I do this by taking
differences, which gives the growth rate of output as:
yˆ t = Aˆ 0 + [α 1 + β 1 (I − I *)]hˆt + [α 2 + β 2 (I − I *)]kˆt

(7)

where ^ indicates denotes a growth rate. Simplifying:
yˆ t = Aˆ 0 + (α 1 − β 1 I *)hˆt + β 1 Ihˆt + (α 2 − β 2 I *)kˆt + β 2 Ikˆt

(8)

Defining δ i = (α i − β i I *) and α 0 = Ât , and adding an error term, ε t , yields our
equation to be estimated:
yˆ t = α 0 + δ 1hˆt + β1 Ihˆt + δ 2 kˆt + β 2 Ikˆt + ε t

(9)

Equation (9) is the primary equation I use to test the impact of institutions on the
productivity of physical and human capital. Of interest are the coefficient estimates for
δ1, δ2, β1, and β2. δ1, and δ2 measure the return to human and physical capital investments
in a country with the worst possible institutional quality (the left y-axis intercept value in
Figure 2), while β1, and β2 are the slopes of the respective lines in the figures, showing an
increasing social return to these capital investments as the country’s institutional quality
improves to the ideal level for a well-functioning market economy.

4.4 Data and Empirical Approach
My initial analysis covers a cross-section of 96 countries for the years 1980-2000. I
obtain data on real output per worker from Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006) and
calculate the cumulative growth of output per worker from 1980 to 2000. The included
countries are a comprehensive mixture of developed and developing nations from all
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regions, mitigating any concerns over sample selection bias that can be an issue in crosscountry growth studies (De Long 1988). A full list of the countries is included in
Appendix Table 3. The average country in our sample had a 16.4 percent increase in
output per worker increase over the period, with Cyprus having the top growth rate of
276 percent and the Republic of Congo seeing output per worker fall by 79 percent.
I measure institutional quality using an index of the ‘risk of expropriation’ within
a country. Produced by the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group (2007) and published in
the International Country Risk Guide, these data were first used as a measure of
institutional quality by Knack and Keefer (1995) and more recently by Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001a; 2001b) and Glaeser et al. (2005). The PRS Groups
annually grades each country on the risk of confiscation or forced nationalization of
property, using a zero-to-ten scale. A score of zero is consistent with a high risk of
property expropriation and a country with a score of 10 would represent an extremely low
risk of expropriation. I feel this measure of institutions is most consistent with Acemoglu
and Johnson’s (2005) finding that property-right institutions are what matter for long-run
growth. While concerns have been raised over ‘outcome’ measures of institutions
(Glaeser et al. 2005), written rules ostensibly designed to protect citizens from
government are useless unless the politically powerful are willing to commit to obeying
the rules (Boettke 2001, 191-265).
I follow convention and use the average risk of expropriation within a country
over the period in question.58 The average country in the sample had a score of 7.3. The
country with the lowest risk of expropriation was Switzerland with an average risk of
expropriation of 9.98, while the country with the greatest average risk of expropriation
58

Specifically, the variable is the average from 1982-1997, obtained from Glaeser et al. (2005).
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was the Democratic Republic of the Congo with a score of 3.71. The Democratic
Republic of the Congo having the highest risk of expropriation is illustrative of the
problem that exists in trying to use input measures of institutions such as constitutions
instead of output measures, since the recent switch from dictatorship to constitutional
democracy has not seemed to reduce expropriation of private property (Boettke and
Leeson 2007).
Our measure of education is average years of schooling per worker and it is
obtained from Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006). They calculate the average number of
years of schooling per worker from primary, secondary, and higher education enrollment
figures using the perpetual inventory method. The perpetual inventory method uses
census-survey figures on attainment by age as a measure of the stock of schooling and
then updates the stock using lagged enrollment figures. I use their estimates of average
schooling per worker in 1980 and 2000 to calculate the change in schooling per worker
by country from 1980-2000. Our measure of the change in physical capital per worker
from 1980 to 2000 is also obtained from Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006). They use the
perpetual inventory method to calculate the physical capital stock per worker using
annual investment data from the Summers and Heston (2000) data set and assuming 7
percent annual depreciation.
These data on a cross-section of 96 countries allow us to begin addressing the
relationship between institutions and the productivity of human and physical capital. Our
equation to be estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is obtained from the
estimating equation derived in section 3:
yˆ t = α 0 + δ 1hˆt + β1 Ihˆt + δ 2 kˆt + β 2 Ikˆt + ε t
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(9)

where ŷt is the cumulative growth rate from 1980 to 2000, α 0 is a constant term, ĥt is
the change in schooling over that period, and k̂t is the change in physical capital. The
interaction terms, Ihˆt and Ikˆt measures how economic growth in different countries
might respond differently to changes in human and physical capital depending upon the
level of institutions, measured here by the average level of expropriation risk during the
period.
In addition to this basic model, I provide several robustness checks that consider
additional explanatory variables. For example, a prominent strain of the development
literature, most notably associated with Jeffrey Sachs (2003), argues that geographic
factors play an extremely important role the economic development of nations. From
Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) I obtain three geographic variables that might
influence the rate of economic growth. The first geographic variable is the minimum air
distance a country is from the core markets of Rotterdam, New York, or Tokyo. The
hypothesis is that the farther a country is from one of these core markets, the more costly
it is for the country to engage in international trade. Reduced trade will, in turn, reduce
gains from the division of labor, economies of scale, and specialization. The second
geographic variable, the percentage of a country’s population living within 100
kilometers of an ocean, also attempts to measures the degree to which it is costly for the
citizens of a country to engage in international trade. A high percentage of a country’s
population with access to an ocean coastline should exert a positive impact on economic
growth.
Finally, a country located in a tropical climate might have low rates of economic
growth because a hot and humid climate reduces the productivity of labor. This can occur
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directly through work effort or indirectly through health. The prevalence of malaria in
tropical climates provides one channel through which tropical climate can affect health
and, indirectly, the productivity of labor. To capture the effect of tropical climate on
growth, I employ a third geographic variable measuring the proportion of a country
located in the tropics as an explanatory variable, with the tropics defined as the area
located between the Tropic of Cancer (23.5 latitude North) and Tropic of Capricorn (23.5
latitude South). These geographic variables are employed both in the baseline empirical
analysis in Section 4.6 as well as the sensitivity analysis in Section 4.7.

4.5 A First Look
Before proceeding to the regression analysis, I provide some evidence for the proposition
that the effect of investment in capital depends on the institutional environment using the
raw data. To get an idea of how the returns to schooling differ by institutional quality, I
broke down countries into two groups: those with the lowest risk of expropriation and
those with the highest risk. I split the sample of 96 countries into two groups based on
their average risk of expropriation score, with countries below the median score of 7.06
being defined as ‘high risk’ and those above defined as ‘low risk.’ Figure 4.3 shows the
relationship between changes in schooling per worker and growth in output per worker
for these different groups.
Among countries with the lowest risk of expropriation, countries with schooling
growth above 50 percent from 1980-2000 grew slightly faster than countries where
schooling growth was below 50 percent. For countries with the highest risk of
expropriation, however, the exact opposite was the case. While all countries with poor
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protection of property rights saw negative real growth during this period, those countries
with schooling growth below 50 percent had an average growth of output per worker of
negative 3.7 percent compared to negative 25.3 percent for countries with schooling
growth above 50 percent. Clearly, countries with bad institutions did poorly over this
time period; however, those countries with the largest increases in education did the
worst.

Figure 4.3
The Stratification of the Returns to Schooling by Risk of Expropriation
Real Growth in Output Per Worker, 1980-2000
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4.6 Empirical Results
Table 4.1 presents our regression results that examine the effect of institutions on the
impact of human and physical capital growth on a country’s rate of economic growth.
Column 1 is the baseline regression consistent with equation (9) derived in Section 4.3.
The model fits the data well, explaining 56 percent of the variation in the change in
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output per worker between 1980 and 2000. The coefficients on both interaction terms are
positive and statistically significant, while the coefficients on the change in physical and
the change in human capital are negative and significant. These results are consistent with
our hypothesis that changes in physical and human capital only have a positive effect on
the rate of economic growth where strong property-rights institutions are in place. In
countries with strong institutions, increases in human and physical capital have a larger
effect on economic growth rates than in countries with bad institutions.

Table 4.1
The Determinants of Economic Growth
Dependent Variable: Growth of Output per Worker, 1980-2000
1
2
3
Independent Variables
Constant
Growth of Schooling Per Worker
(Baier et al.), 1980-2000
Growth of Physical Capital Per
Worker, 1980-2000
Growth of Schooling Per Worker ×
Risk of Expropriation
Growth of Physical Capital Per
Worker × Risk of Expropriation

-1.17
(0.28)
-0.719 ***
(3.59)
-0.789 ***
(8.05)
0.098 ***
(3.60)
0.161 ***
(10.83)

Percentage of Population within
100km of Coast
Air Distance from Major Trading
Centers
Percentage of Land Area Located
in Tropics

4

0.96
(0.11)
-0.734 ***
(3.64)
-0.793 ***
(8.10)
0.100 ***

6.17
(0.81)
-0.637 ***
(3.13)
-0.735 ***
(6.56)
0.087 ***

9.91
(1.54)
-0.362 *
(1.67)
-0.762 ***
(7.62)
0.050 *

(3.64)
0.162 ***
(10.73)
-0.042
(0.34)

(3.14)
0.153 ***
(9.63)

(1.68)
0.158 ***
(11.65)

-0.0018
(1.15)
-0.243 **
(2.54)

Number of Observations
96
96
96
Adj. r-squared
0.56
0.56
0.56
Absolute value of heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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96
0.59

In Columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 1 I included additional geographic variables
thought to impact economic growth. Importantly, the inclusion of these variables does not
qualitatively change the results of our basic regression. In all three additional columns,
the signs and coefficients on each of the variables are very similar to those in Column 1.
One notable exception is in Column 4, where the coefficients on human and physical
capital per worker variables were reduced in magnitude. Note, however, that the
coefficients on each of the interaction terms are very similar to the coefficients in the
previous regressions suggesting that good institutions still channel physical and human
capital to productive ends in tropical environments.
The only geographic variable to add any explanatory power to the model is the
percentage of the land area in the tropics. A country entirely located in the tropics is
expected to have a cumulative growth rate 24.3 percentage points lower from 1980-2000
than a country with none of its area in the tropics. The other two geographic variables are
not statistically or economically meaningful, with the percentage of the population within
100 kilometers even having the opposite sign of what is expected.
In Figure 4.4 I take the coefficients from Column 1 above and put them in the
context of the framework put forth in Figure 4.2. The negative left y-axis intercept values
of -0.719 and -0.789 for human and physical capital respectively show the socially
negative returns to investments in these areas in countries scoring the worst possible
value on the risk of expropriation measure (remember this index is increasing in property
rights protection). The intercept values along the right y-axis show the return in a country
with ideal institutional quality. I find that the ‘break-even’ point is a risk of expropriation
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score of 7.33 for human capital investment and 4.90 for physical capital investment.59 In
countries with a high risk of expropriation (a score below 4.90) the social returns to both
types of capital investment are negative. Increases in either type of capital have a positive
effect on output per worker in countries with a risk of expropriation score greater than
7.33.

Figure 4.4
The Marginal Effect of Capital on Growth: An Estimate
∂∆YPW ∂∆YPW
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The level of institutional quality required to generate a positive return to
education is higher than the level necessary to produce a positive return to physical
capital investment. This implies that in countries with mid-range scores (between 4.90
59

A risk of expropriation score of 7.33 is a consistent with the institutions of a country such as
South Africa while Guinea-Bissau is a country just below 4.90.
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and 7.33) that focusing on investments in physical capital are likely to promote economic
development to a much greater extent than additional investments in human capital. The
greater slope coefficient for physical capital implies that the productivity of physical
capital investment is more sensitive to institutional quality than the productivity of human
capital investment.
My estimates explain why some countries that have had large increases in formal
schooling from 1980 to 2000 have also seen real output decline over that period. A
country that falls in this category is Haiti, which had an average risk of expropriation
over this period of 4.17. Education levels in Haiti increased by over 120 percent from
1980 to 2000. At the same time, however, real output per worker declined by 26 percent.
Guineau-Bissau, Iran, Madagascar, Niger, the Republic of the Congo, and Uganda are all
countries with low (below 5.6) risk of expropriation scores that had increases in
education levels over 80 percent and real output per worker declines of greater than 20
percent.

4.7 Sensitivity Analysis
A potential concern about the basic results presented in Section 6 is that they might be
sensitive to how institutional quality or changes in schooling are measured. For example,
much of the cross-country economic growth literature uses educational levels from Barro
and Lee (2000). While I employ the Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006) data in our initial
analysis because I believe they are more up-to-date and expansive than the Barro-Lee
calculations, I obtained the Barro-Lee data for the available countries in our data set in
order to test the robustness of our results to an alternative measure of schooling increase.
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From the Barro and Lee (2000) data set I obtained the years of education for individuals
fifteen and older in 1980 and 2000 and then calculated the change in education from 1980
to 2000.60 Twelve countries in our sample were not in the data set thus the sample
contains only 84 countries.61 The correlation between the two measures of schooling is
0.56.
Table 4.2 presents the results using the Barro and Lee measure of schooling rather
than the Baier, Dwyer and Tamura measure. In the table I consider each of the
specifications from Table 1. The basic specification is in Column 1, and the results are
similar in significance to our previous results. In the other specifications the results are
consistent with those in Table 1 with the exception of the growth of physical capital per
worker. While the sign on that variable is still negative, it is not statistically significant in
Columns 2-4. Two other items of note are that air distance from major trading centers is
statistically significant and the coefficient on the percentage of population within 100k of
the coast now has the correct sign.
To this point our measure of institutional quality has been the ‘risk of
expropriation’ of private property. The other measure of institutions frequently employed
in the literature is the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index by Gwartney and
Lawson (2003). The EFW index measures the degree to which a country’s economy is
consistent with ‘economic freedom,’ e.g., personal choice, voluntary exchange, and
security of private property.

60

Note that here education is not measured in per worker terms but in per capita (15 and older)
terms. The Barro and Lee (2000) data set does not provide enough detail for conversion to per
worker terms.
61
The regressions presented in Table 1 were run using only the 84 countries available in Table 2
and the results were qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
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Table 4.2
The Determinants of Economic Growth: Alternative Measure of Education
Dependent Variable: Growth of Output per Worker, 1980-2000
1
2
3
4
Independent Variables
Constant
Growth of Schooling Per Worker
(Barro), 1980-2000
Growth of Physical Capital Per
Worker, 1980-2000
Growth of Schooling Per Worker ×
Risk of Expropriation
Growth of Physical Capital Per
Worker × Risk of Expropriation

2.20
(0.39)
-0.800 ***
(3.10)
-0.593 *

1.21
(0.17)
-0.788 ***
(2.92)
-0.592 *

(1.85)
0.106 ***
(2.69)
0.134 ***

(1.83)
0.104 **
(2.52)
0.133 ***

(3.47)

(3.43)
0.017
(0.18)

Percentage of Population within
100km of Coast
Air Distance from Major Trading
Centers
Percentage of Land Area Located
in Tropics

12.74 ***
(2.67)
-0.628 **

10.74
(1.53)
-0.779 ***
(2.81)
-0.478
(1.50)
0.106 **
(2.54)
0.117 ***

(2.37)
-0.470
(1.43)
0.087 **
(2.28)
0.117 ***

(3.05)

(2.98)

-0.0023 *
(1.69)
-0.243 ***
(3.21)

Number of Observations
84
84
84
Adj. r-squared
0.67
0.63
0.64
Absolute value of heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.

84
0.68

The index measures the quality of a country’s policies and institutions in five
areas: (1) size of government, (2) legal structure and security of property rights, (3)
access to sound money, (4) freedom to trade internationally, and (5) regulation of capital,
labor, and business. Data from third-party international sources such as the World Bank
and IMF are used to derive each country’s ratings in each the five areas. The area
rankings are then averaged together to create a summary ranking for each country

82

included in the index.62 The ranking theoretically varies from 0 (no economic freedom) to
10 (complete economic freedom).
As an additional measure of institutions, the EFW index has two advantages.
First, like the risk of expropriation data, the index has been used in a number of studies
on institutions and growth (see, for example, Dawson 1998; Sturm and De Haan 2001;
Adkins, Moomaw, and Savvides, 2002; Cole 2003; Gwartney, Holcombe, and Lawson
2006). Second, since the EFW index is calculated using policy variables such as tax
rates, use of the index provides clearer guidance to policymakers unlike indirect measures
of institutions such as surveys or instrumental variables (Gwartney, Holcombe, and
Lawson 2006). For the time period of 1980 to 2000, the EFW index is available at fiveyear intervals starting with 1980. The average country in the data set had a mean
economic freedom score of 5.67, equal to Guatemala’s mean summary ranking for the
period. Hong Kong has the highest average economic freedom over the period with a
score of 8.6 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo has the lowest score at 3.61.
Table 4.3 shows the results for the regressions run in Table 4.1 with the average
EFW score inserted used instead of the risk of expropriation. The results are less robust
using the EFW index, with growth of physical capital per worker and its interaction with
the index being statistically insignificant in all but the last specification. The growth of
schooling per worker and its interaction with economic freedom have the correct signs,
however, and are strongly significant except in the final specification that includes the
tropical location variable. In all cases, however, a joint F-test shows that each pair of

62

The most recent version of the EFW index (Gwartney and Lawson, 2006), which measures
economic freedom for 2004, rates 130 countries. The decision to include or exclude from the
index depends solely on the quality of the available data, with data being unavailable mainly for
autocratic or small countries.
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variables is jointly significant. These results seem to confirm the general hypothesized
relationship found earlier.

Table 4.3
The Determinants of Economic Growth: Alternative Measure of Institutions
Dependent Variable: Growth of Output per Worker, 1980-2000
2
1
3
4
Independent Variables
Constant
Growth of Schooling Per Worker
(Baier et al.), 1980-2000
Growth of Physical Capital Per
Worker, 1980-2000
Growth of Schooling Per Worker ×
Avg EFW 1980-2000
Growth of Physical Capital Per
Worker × Avg EFW 1980-2000

9.27 *
(1.68)
-0.732 ***
(3.03)
-0.220
(0.50)
0.109 ***
(3.03)
0.097
(1.46)

Percentage of Population within
100km of Coast
Air Distance from Major Trading
Centers
Percentage of Land Area Located
in Tropics

12.96
(1.21)
-0.782 ***
(2.78)
-0.234
(0.53)
0.116 ***
(2.78)
0.100
(1.52)
-0.06
(0.47)

26.05 ***
(2.94)
-0.529 **
(2.18)
-0.192
(0.50)
0.079 **
(2.19)
0.091
(1.55)

-0.005 **
(2.48)
-0.376 ***
(3.70)

Number of Observations
103
103
103
Adj. r-squared
0.35
0.35
0.39
Absolute value of heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.

4.8

24.49 ***
(3.44)
-0.297
(0.96)
-0.431
(1.25)
0.044
(0.97)
0.129 **
(2.47)

103
0.44

Conclusion

Since World War II, the development-policymaking community has stressed the
importance of capital accumulation. Large amounts of aid from developed countries and
international aid organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank
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have flowed to developing countries to encourage the capital investment though
necessary for poor countries to ‘take-off’ on the path to development. Cross-country
studies show, however, that the macroeconomic relationship between capital
accumulation and growth is not as robust as the microeconomic relationship would
suggest.
In this paper I provide an answer to this paradox by developing a model that
allows the effect of changes in capital on changes in output per worker to vary along with
the quality of institutions in a country. I empirically test this hypothesis using data on a
large cross-section of countries and find that the effect of changes in human and physical
capital varies considerably along the institutional quality continuum, measured by IRG
data on the risk of expropriation within a country. I calculate that for countries with risk
of expropriation scores below 4.90, additions to both the stock of physical and human
capital have a negative effect on growth of output per worker. For countries between 4.90
and 7.33, increases in physical capital per worker have a positive impact but increases in
schooling are still negative. Above 7.33, all increases in capital per worker increase
output per worker.
The finding that capital increases only have a positive impact on growth once a
‘break-even’ level of institutional quality is a strong argument against naive proposals to
double the capital stock in developing countries to double their income.63 If aid flows are
inevitable, however, these findings suggest that spending should be focused on
investment in physical capital if the country has a risk of expropriation score between
4.90 and 7.33. More importantly, however, these results focus attention towards
63

For example, Jeffrey Sachs (2005, 250) has said that “The likelihood is that doubling the
human and physical capital stock will actually more than double the income level, at least at very
low levels of capital per person.”
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institutional reform as the key to economic progress so that future increases in physical
and human capital will generate positive social returns as well as private ones.
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Chapter 5
Summary and Conclusion
At its core, the economics of education is about political economy since all of the
important questions revolve around government involvement in education financing and
provision. Most of the enduring research questions in the economics of education would
be of little concern if there were no public involvement in the financing or production of
education. The effectiveness of resource usage within schools is a far less interesting and
important research question if school spending is the result of voluntary actions between
parents and education providers instead of the outcome of collective action. Thus the
economic study of education is ultimately about the effectiveness of the political, social,
legal, and economic institutions that have evolved over time to finance and produce
educated citizens. This dissertation contributes to the scholarly literature by more
explicitly considering the effect that the variation in educational institutions across
geographic space has on education outcomes and financing.
Chapter 2 analyzes the effect of racial diversity on educational outcomes using
cross-sectional data on Ohio school districts. Racial diversity has a negative association
with school district passage rates on state proficiency exams. The results are robust to a
variety of empirical approaches and alternative specifications and evidence is presented
that suggest reverse-causality is not driving the results. The higher a school districts
academic performance in 1990, the more diverse that district was in 2000, suggesting that
school quality leads to diversity, not vice versa. While the exact causal link between
racial diversity and school performance is unclear, identification of a negative
relationship between diversity at the school district level and school district performance
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is a first step towards determining if the cause is the racial peer effect channel or the
voting channel.
A one standard deviation increase in racial diversity is associated with a decline in
district math test scores of between 1.1 and 3.3 percentage points, depending upon the
empirical specification. While seemingly not that large, recall that this is the net effect of
racial diversity on test scores. Since some previous research has found that AfricanAmerican students benefit from increased diversity while White and Asian students do
worse from it, this suggests that the effects of diversity on individuals might be quite
larger if disaggregated. At the same time, however, maximizing school performance is
not the same thing as maximizing utility. Households take many factors into account
before deciding where to live and send their children to school (Pritchett and Filmer
1999). The possibility of lower test scores might well be an acceptable trade-off for
parents wanting to live in a racially diverse community.
Over the past thirty years a primary reason for the increase in state financing of
education has been a wave of court-ordered school finance reforms that have significantly
increased state spending on education (Murray, Evans, and Schwab 1998). There have
been efforts in nearly every state to challenge the constitutionality of school finance
systems that produce unequal levels of school funding and unequal school outcomes
among school districts. Even in states where the school funding system was ruled to be
constitutional, litigation has spurred considerable changes. Since 1970, every state has
changed their school finance system to create a more equal distribution of funding among
districts (Hoxby 2001). States responded in many ways to these constitutional challenges.
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Ohio, for example, gave school districts the ability to raise additional revenue by levying
a tax on income instead of relying solely on property taxes.
The fact that the State of Ohio gave local school districts the option of asking
voters to approve a school district income tax provides an excellent opportunity to test
some elements of the literature on government choice among tax instruments. Standard
public finance principles would suggest that local governments such as school districts
should diversify across as many revenues sources as possible. The idea is that
diversification helps to mitigate the effects of any adverse shocks to school district
revenues. A school district relying too much on the property tax, for example, might see a
catastrophic fall in revenues if the largest manufacturer in the area closed. Given this risk,
it is surprising that only one-fifth of school districts in Ohio utilize the income tax.
Spry (2005) provides evidence that competition among local school districts
depresses the use of an income tax. The argument is that a school district enacting an
income tax in an area with a competitive local education market would soon see all of its
high-income households migrate to nearby districts without an income tax. Only in rural
areas where the costs of moving are higher either in terms of commuting distance (if
remaining at current job) or job relocation will we see widespread use of an income tax,
other things equal. This explanation fits the raw data very well, since most of the school
districts using the income tax are in rural areas.
Chapter 3 uses spatial econometric techniques to test for spatial dependence and
spatial error correlation in the use of an income tax. Once spatial effects are accounted
for, fiscal competition among local school districts no longer is found to depress use of
the income tax. The spatial lag term is positive and significant, providing evidence of
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yardstick competition in income tax adoption. School districts are more likely to adopt an
income tax if their neighbors currently utilize and income tax. The empirical results point
to tax exporting as the primary reason why school districts do not utilize the income tax
more often. The burden of the school district income tax is 100 percent on local residents,
whereas some proportion of a property tax that raised the same amount of revenue would
be exported onto non-resident property owners. Given that, the more interesting question
is not why do so few school districts utilize the income tax but why do so many?
While Chapters 2 and 3 deal with fairly narrow but important topics in the
economics of education, Chapter 4 deals with the link between education and growth.
Chapter 4 focuses on the importance of institutions for the return on the accumulation of
human and physical capital. Since the 1940s, the international development community
has advocated and funded human and physical capital accumulation efforts in the
developing world to push these countries onto a higher growth path. The cross-country
evidence is mixed, however, and sometimes countries economically stagnate in spite of
significant increases in education levels and physical capital.
Chapter 4 develops a theoretical model that allows the effect of changes in capital
on output growth per worker to vary with institutional quality. Using a large cross-section
of countries, I empirically test this model using data on the ‘risk of expropriation’ within
a country as a measure of institutional quality. The results of the chapter are that the
return on human and physical capital investment does vary considerably with institutional
quality. For countries with risk of expropriation scores up to 4.90, additions to human and
physical capital lower the growth of output per worker. Between 4.90 and 7.33, physical
capital per worker has a positive impact on growth of output per worker but increasing
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human capital per worker still reduces growth of output per worker. When the risk of
expropriation in a country is above 7.33, increases in both human and physical capital per
worker raise the growth rate of output per worker.
This finding has three important implications for international development
efforts. First, it shows that lack of capital is not the primary problem facing most
undeveloped nations. Second, assuming holding the amount of foreign aid going to a
country constant, the returns to physical and human capital differ at different levels of
institutional quality. Specifically, for those countries with risk of expropriation scores
between 4.90 and 7.33, aid should be shifted towards physical capital accumulation and
away from human capital accumulation efforts. More importantly, the third implication
of Chapter 4 is that development efforts should be focused on reforming institutions.
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Appendix Table 1
Racial Diversity and Non-Math Test Scores
Writing
Citizenship
Reading
Science
Constant
-0.94 ***
0.16
-1.11 ***
0.23
(3.21)
(0.92)
(3.88)
(1.10)
Racial Diversity 2000
-0.1206 ***
-0.0951 ***
-0.2093 ***
-0.0416 *
(3.51)
(3.74)
(5.38)
(1.68)
Expenditure Per Pupil
-0.0045
-0.0039 **
-0.0074 **
-0.0038
(1.45)
(1.97)
(2.03)
(1.48)
Income
0.0002
0.0005
0.0005
0.0006
(0.30)
(0.94)
(0.61)
(1.03)
Attendance
1.9351 ***
0.8874 ***
2.1585 ***
0.7801 ***
(6.55)
(4.96)
(7.45)
(3.66)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio
-0.0014
-0.0015
-0.0016
-0.0026 **
(0.89)
(1.49)
(1.04)
(2.18)
Average Teacher Salary
0.0010
-0.0001
0.0005
0.0008
(1.15)
(0.19)
(0.47)
(1.25)
Teacher Inexperience
-0.0202
-0.0212
-0.0839 **
0.0097
(0.56)
(0.88)
(2.35)
(0.39)
Density
-0.0027 *
-0.0017
-0.0038 **
-0.0018 *
(1.95)
(1.27)
(1.99)
(1.84)
District Size
-0.0012 **
-0.0010 ***
-0.0011 *
-0.0007 **
(2.09)
(3.47)
(1.91)
(2.05)
College
0.1153 ***
0.0524 **
0.1564 ***
0.0475 *
(3.22)
(2.23)
(4.17)
(1.82)
Lunch
-0.1365 ***
-0.1198 ***
-0.1836 ***
-0.0705 ***
(3.58)
(4.19)
(4.56)
(2.55)
Number of Observations
607
607
607
607
R-squared
0.55
0.56
0.66
0.33
Note : Expenditure Per Pupil, Income, Average Teacher Salary, Density, and District Size in
thousands.
Absolute value of heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Appendix Table 2
Marginal Effects Times Standard Deviations

Variable

Constant
Within 10
Within 12
Within 15
Herfindahl
Property Tax Price
Income Tax Price
% Renters
City Tax Dummy
% Senior Citizens
% of Agricultural Property
% of Mineral Property
% of Business Property
% of Rural Residents

Non-Spatial SARP
SDP Model SDP Model SDP Model SDP Model
Probit
Model
(Table 2, (Table 2, (Table 2, (Table 2,
(Table 2, (Table 2,
Column 3) Column 1) Column 2) Column 3)
Column 1) Column 2)
0.000
-0.069

0.000
-0.067

0.000
-0.057

0.000

0.000

0.000

-0.006
-0.008
0.062
-0.122
-0.002
0.060
-0.014
0.065
-0.052
-0.056
0.024

0.058
-0.120
-0.004
0.054
-0.019
0.054
-0.054
-0.056
0.013
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0.056
-0.044
0.030
0.055
0.003
0.070
-0.025
-0.072
0.054

0.054
-0.099
0.033
0.053
-0.008
0.068
-0.017
-0.068
0.060

0.059
-0.095
0.031
0.069
-0.002
0.080
-0.028
-0.093
0.062

-0.010
0.050
-0.050
0.024
0.055
0.000
0.064
-0.029
-0.069
0.047

Appendix Table 3
List of Countries
Algeria
Guinea-Bissau²
Papau New Guinea
Argentina
Haiti
Paraguay
Australia
Honduras
Peru
Austria
Hong Kong
Philippines
Bangladesh
Hungary
Poland
Belgium
India
Portugal
Benin¹
Indonesia
Romania²
Bolivia
Iran
Rwanda¹
Botswana
Ireland
Senegal
Brazil
Israel
Sierra Leone
Bulgaria²
Italy
Singapore
Burundi¹
Jamaica
South Africa
Cameroon
Japan
South Korea
Canada
Jordan
Spain
Central African Republic¹
Kenya
Sri Lanka
Chad¹
Kuwait
Sweden
Chile
Madagascar²
Switzerland
China
Malawi
Syria
Colombia
Malaysia
Taiwan
Congo, Democratic Republic Mali
Tanzania²
Congo, Republic of the
Mauritius¹
Thailand
Costa Rica
Mexico
Togo
Cote d'Ivoire²
Morocco²
Trinidad & Tobago
Denmark
Myanmar
Tunisia
Dominican Rep.
Namibia²
Turkey
Ecuador
Nepal¹
Uganda
Egypt
Netherlands
United Arab Emirates²
El Salvador
New Zealand
United Kingdom
Finland
Nicaragua
United States
France
Niger
Uruguay
Gabon²
Nigeria²
Venezuela
Germany
Norway
Zambia
Ghana
Oman²
Zimbabwe
Greece
Pakistan
Guatemala
Panama
¹ Countries without risk of expropriation data and thus excluded from Table 4.1 regression
² Countries without Barro schooling data and thus excluded from Table 4.2 regressions.
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